The paper analyses operational coordination mechanisms between a producer and a supplier within a supply chain having private local information. For a make to order production setting the coordination is achieved through the combined use of a task-oriented and a control-oriented type of instrument. The task-oriented instrument describes the producer s procurement policy for components whereas t...

This double Issue Brief on the issue of managed care contracts and care coordination has been prepared for the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration as part of a series that examines legal issues in managed care for persons with mental illness and addiction disorders. This Issue Brief is presented in two parts. Part 1 presents an analysis, based on managed care contract data...

In this paper we focus on the coordination of multiagents through a revenue-cost-sharing mechanism. We consider a grand-coalition consisting of finite agents, who undertake part of the costs individually, while the remaining costs C and the total revenues R are shared between them with a revenue-cost-sharing contract. We introduce a novel approach in the form of a cooperative game for a finite ...

A large proportion of consumer returns fall into the category of false failure returns, which refer to returns without functional defects. In this paper, we consider profits resulting from exerting costly effort to reduce false failure returns in a reverse supply chain. The supply chain as a whole has a strong incentive to reduce such returns for cost saving. However, retailers typically enjoy ...

In this paper, we apply a combined revenue sharing and buyback contract to investigate the channel coordination of two-echelon supply chain with loss-averse retailer. Since decision makers usually take on more risks, Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) measure is introduced hedge against it retailer’s objective maximize CVaR utility. We obtain optimal order quantity under contract. It shown that t...

Contracts are crucial for curbing opportunism, a common phenomenon in construction projects. This article differentiates among the contractual mechanisms of obligatoriness, monitoring, and coordination, studies relationships between complexity above functions different types opportunistic behavior. Using data from 262 clients (i.e., parties issuing contracts) Chinese industry, this reveals that...

Intelligent transformation of manufacturers requires smart logistics collaboration, which improves competitiveness. In this study, we construct a Stackelberg game model based on the mutual influence and restriction in relationship between manufacturer service provider (LSP) undergoing transformation. We investigate whether cost-sharing (CS) or revenue-sharing (RS) contracts can coordinate suppl...

This paper reviews the decisions, coordination contract, and altruistic preference of an e-commerce supply chain (eSC) composed a manufacturer third-party platform (platform). The research derives optimal decisions in decentralized model with preference; it is indicated that can help increase sales price service level. Although platform’s not beneficial to its own profits, manufacturer’s profit...