The paper analyzes spatial Cournot competition among multi-store firms. It demonstrates that the complex problem of determining equilibrium store locations for competing multi-store firms can be approximated by a simple one, in which each firm behaves as a multi-store monopolist in choosing its store locations. A firm’s equilibrium store locations often coincide with its monopoly locations, and...

This paper investigates the ability of the largest producer in an electricity market to manipulate both the electricity and emission allowances markets to its advantage. A Stackelberg game to analyze this situation is constructed in which the largest firm plays the role of the leader, while the medium-sized firms are treated as Cournot followers with price-taking fringes that behave competitive...

This paper proposes a distributed algorithm for games with shared coupling constraints based on the variational approach and proximal-point algorithm. The demonstrates effectiveness of in computing generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems using local data communication neighbors any networked game. achieves goal reflecting decisions Nash–Cournot game under partial-decision information while ...

We consider two game-theoretic models of the generation capacity expansion problem in liberalized electricity markets. The first is an open loop equilibrium model, where generation companies simultaneously choose capacities and quantities to maximize their individual profit. The second is a closed loop model, in which companies first choose capacities maximizing their profit anticipating the ma...

We consider static finite-player network games and their continuum analogs graphon games. Existence uniqueness results are provided as well convergence of the game optimal strategy profiles to for also show that equilibrium a provide approximate Nash equilibria Connections with mean field discussed. A motivating application Cournot competition is presented, explicit computation its provided.

Strategic market games model strategic exchange economies as noncooperative simultaneous moves games. A recent paper by Bloch and Ghosal (J. Econ. Theory, 74 (1997), 368{384.) has shown that strategic market games might exhibit a rather counterintuitive comparative statics property: an increase in the number of traders on the own side of the market might increase the equilibrium utility for any...

Heterogeneous duopolies with product differentiation and isoelastic price functions are examined in which one firm is quantity setter and the other is price setter. The reaction functions and the CournotBertrand (CB) equilibrium are first determined. It is shown that the best response dynamics with continuous time scales and without time delays is always locally asymptotically stable. This stab...

In this paper, we consider a source, which communicates to destination, with cooperation of a relay node. An eavesdropper is tapping the second hop, when all the links undergo Rayleigh fading. Relay nodes are the market players, who compete to trade their power to source in order to maximize their incentives. We evaluate the secrecy outage probability of a dual-hop decode-and-forward (DF) thres...