The conditional commitment abilities of mutually transparent computer agents have been studied in previous work on games and program equilibrium. This literature has shown how these can help resolve Prisoner’s Dilemmas other failures cooperation complete information settings. But inefficiencies due to private neglected thus far this literature, despite the fact that problems are pervasive might...

Zhang and Zhou (2016) use the concept of Bayesian persuasion due to Kamenica Gentzkow (2011) analyze information disclosure in a contest with one-sided asymmetric information. They show that an effort-maximizing designer can manipulate increase expected efforts contest, based upon active participation by all types informed player. We allow some exert no effort showing how this (i) applicability...

We study information disclosure in a dynamic multi-agent research contest, where each agent privately searches for innovations and submits his best to compete winner-takes-all prize (Taylor, 1995). Different policies on the agents' submissions induce different equilibrium behavior, making design of useful instrument contest sponsors. analyze compare various with finite or infinite horizons. Wit...

We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in second-price auction. The seller faces a trade-off: more improves efficiency of allocation but creates higher rents for bidders. disclosure policy that maximizes revenue is to fully reveal low values (where competition high) pool high low). size determined by critical quantile independent distribution and only dependent on number d...