Abstract Bertrand–Edgeworth competition has recently been analyzed under imperfect buyer mobility, as a game in which, once prices are chosen, static subgame (BS) is played where the buyers choose which seller to visit (see, e.g., Burdett et al. J Political Econ 109:1060–1085, 2001). Our paper considers symmetric duopoly two play two-stage BS of information after price setting. An “assessment e...

and Applied Analysis 3 The Nash equilibrium E is located at the intersection of the two reaction curves which represent the locus of points of vanishingmarginal profits in (5). In the following, we assume that (10) is satisfied, so the Nash equilibrium E exists. The study of the local stability of equilibrium points is based on the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the (6): J = [ 1 + 11 1 (...

We analyze a nonlinear discrete time Cournot duopoly game, where players have adaptive expectations. The evolution of expected outputs over time is generated by the iteration of a noninvertible two-dimensional map. The long-run behavior is characterized by multistability, that is, the presence of coexisting stable consistent beliefs, which correspond to Nash equilibria in the quantity space. He...

Maybe an event can't be modeled completely through one game but there is more chance with several games. With emphasis on players' rationality, we present new properties of strategic games, which result in production of other games. Here, a new attitude to modeling will be presented in game theory as dynamic system of strategic games and its some applications such as analysis of the clash betwe...

In the context of international gas markets, we investigate the interaction between price formation and communication networks in a bilateral duopoly with heterogeneous buyers. Given the communication structure conveyed by a particular buyers-sellers network graph, prices are formed as the outcome of dynamic decentralized negotiations among traders. We characterize, for any network structure, t...

This paper establishes the Cournot-Bertrand duopoly game models with bounded rationality expectations under assumption that players are fair-minded agents who may adopt delay decision. The existence and local stability of equilibrium points investigated. effects key parameters on long-term dynamical evolution process investigated by numerical simulation. Furthermore, performance is examined usi...

We prove existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) in nonstationary undiscounted infinite horizon dynamic games, by exploiting a structural property (Uniformly Bounded Reachability) of the state dynamics. This allows us to identify a suitable finite horizon equilibrium relaxation, the ending state Constrained MPE, that captures the relevant features of an infinite horizon MPE for a long enou...