We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs, and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no c...

We estimate a medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the Japanese economy following Christiano et al. [Christiano, L., Eichenbaum, M., Evans, C., 2005. Nominal rigidities and the dynamic effects of a shock to monetary policy. J. Polit. Economy 113 (1), 1–45]. By using actual capital utilization data and modifying the formulation of utilization following Greenwood et al. [G...

This paper introduces a notion of p-best response set (p-BR). We build on this notion in order to provide a new set-valued concept: the minimal p-best response set (p-MBR). After proving general existence results of the p-MBR, we show that it characterizes set-valued stability concepts in a dynamic with Poisson revision opportunities borrowed fromMatsui and Matsuyama [An approach to equilibrium...

The present paper studies repeated Bertrand oligopoly with multiple markets. The markets are subject to independent, stochastic fluctuations in demands. According to the literature, the demand fluctuations generally hinder collusion, while the multimarket contact sometimes facilitates it. We show that when only partial collusion is sustainable under a single market, the per-market expected prof...

Stochastic best response models provide sharp predictions about equilibrium selection when the noise level is arbitrarily small. The difficulty is that, when the noise is extremely small, it can take an extremely long time for a large population to reach the stochastically stable equilibrium. An important exception arises when players interact locally in small close-knit groups; in this case co...

Generic extensive form games of perfect information have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) show that in a stochastic evolutionary model also non-subgame perfect equilibriumstrategies may well survive in the long run. In a different model of evolution in the agent normal form of generic extensive form games of perfect information Hart (2002) shows that under suit...

The purpose of this note is to demonstrate a sufficient condition for discrete tâtonnement process to lead to chaos in a general equilibrium model with multiple commodities. The result indicates that as the speed of price adjustment increases the discrete tâtonnement process is complex in a general equilibrium economy in which there are multiple equilibria. JEL classification: E32; C62 Keywards...

Tractable Latent State Filtering for Non-Linear DSGE Models Using a Second-Order Approximation* This paper develops a novel approach for estimating latent state variables of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models that are solved using a second-order accurate approximation. I apply the Kalman filter to a statespace representation of the second-order solution based on the ‘pruning’ ...