We evaluate the asset pricing implications of a class of models in which risk sharing is imperfect because of the limited enforcement of intertemporal contracts. Lustig (2004) has shown that in such a model the asset pricing kernel can be written as a simple function of the aggregate consumption growth rate and the growth rate of consumption of the set of households that do not face binding enf...

We evaluate the asset pricing implications of a class of models in which risk sharing is imperfect because of limited enforcement of intertemporal contracts. Lustig (2004) has shown that in such a model the asset pricing kernel can be written as a simple function of the aggregate consumption growth rate and the growth rate of consumption of the set of households that do not face binding enforce...

In this paper we study experimentally four remedies to overcome inefficiencies that arise from the incompleteness of contracts. These remedies are reciprocity, repeated game effects, social embeddedness, and incentive contracts. In our baseline treatment we find that reciprocity is a powerful contract enforcement device. A second experiment establishes that repeated game effects interact with r...

Do legal rules matter for economic outcomes? Can changing the details of specific laws affect overall institutions in a way that will have a significant short-term impact? Is it particularly effective to change securities law and regulation? For all three questions, a common answer in both economics and law is “no.” The intellectual underpinning for this position is influential work by Ronald C...

We provide experimental evidence that contractual incompleteness, i.e., the absence of third party enforcement of workers’ effort or the quality of the good traded, causes a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. If contracts are complete the vast majority of trades are initiated by public offers. Most trades take place in one-shot transactions and the contracting parties are ...

We integrate, extend and apply economic, legal, sociological and psychological governance perspectives on relational contracts in the face of the heretofore neglected contractual hazard of “displaced agency” (i.e., the costs that accrue to a series of interdependent transactions as a result of counterparties’ incentives to pass through or shift costs or responsibilities to a counterparty not re...

law department, ferdowsi university of mashhad the importance of the exploitation contracts protecting the literary and artistic rights has, in some legal systems like france, resulted in the devising of general and common regulations about the formation of the above-mentioned contracts. however, so far no independent section has been thought of in the iranian legal system for explicating commo...

Law plays a central, but under-appreciated role in knowledge work. While economic and policy scholars debate the way in which changing legal institutions, particularly expanding property rights, shape the daily lives of knowledge workers, lawyers, with their contracts and concerns, are not key actors on the stage of detailed ethnographies of knowledge work. We reconcile these alternatives argui...

In this paper we study experimentally four remedies to overcome inefficiencies that arise from the incompleteness of contracts. These remedies are reciprocity, repeated game effects, social embeddedness, and incentive contracts. In our baseline treatment we find that reciprocity is a powerful contract enforcement device. A second experiment establishes that repeated game effects interact with r...

Background: ART contracts involving third parties have been created while clinical reproductive treatments are globally widespread. Iran is pioneer in applying these treatments in middle-east due to shii’at jurisprudence prescribing them. This key role in region, has raised Iranian jurists’ responsibility in developing a legal system regarding administration of ART. The most significant part of...