In this article, I review two recent developments in the theory of computation of general equilibria. First, following Brown, DeMarzo and Eaves (1996) several papers have developed globally convergent algorithms for the computation of general equilibria in models with incomplete asset markets. I review some of the developments in that area. Second, new developments in computational algebraic ge...

This paper uses an adapted version of the linear tracing procedure, suggested by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), in order to discriminate between two types of multiple Nash equilibria. Equilibria of the same type are pay-off equivalent in the analysed multiple-unit unit price auction where two sellers compete in order to serve a fixed demand. The equilibria where the firm with the larger capacity b...

Nash equilibria for strategic games were characterized by Peleg and Tijs (1996) as those solutions satisfying the properties of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. There are other solutions, like the e-Nash equilibria, which enjoy nice properties and appear to be interesting substitutes for Nash equilibria when their existence cannot be guaranteed. They can be characte...

Using standard control theory in determining the firm's optimal dynamic investment decisions it turns out that it is always optimal to approach a long run optimal level of capital. In some cases, this equilibrium is reached within finite time, but usually it will be approached asymptotically. Also a necessary condition is determined under which history dependent equilibria can occur. Some of th...

In this paper we reconsider the concept of Berge equilibrium. In a recent work, [Colman, A. M., Körner, T., Musy, O. and Tazdaït, T. [2011] Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria, Journal of Mathematical Psychology 55, 166–175]. proposed a correspondence for two-player games between Berge and Nash equilibria by permutation of the utility functions. We define here more gene...

Computing equilibria in general equilibria models with incomplete asset (GEI) markets is technically difficult. The standard numerical methods for computing these equilibria are based on homotopy methods. Despite recent advances in computational economics, much more can be done to enlarge the catalog of techniques for computing GEI equilibria. This paper presents an interior point algorithm tha...

Within the context of DNA rings, we analyze the relationship between intrinsic shape and the existence of multiple stable equilibria, either nicked or cyclized with the same link. A simple test, based on a perturbation expansion of symmetry breaking within a continuum elastic rod model, provides good predictions of the occurrence of such multiple equilibria. The reliability of these predictions...

This paper studies n-player games where players’ beliefs about their opponents’ behaviour are modelled as non-additive probabilities. The concept of an ’equilibrium under uncertainty’ which is introduced in this paper extends the equilibriumnotion of Dowand Werlang (1994) to n-player games in strategic form. Existence of such an equilibrium is demonstrated under usual conditions. For low degree...

Strategies in a stochastic game are δ > 0 perfect if the induced one-stage games have certain δ equilibrium properties. Sufficient conditions are proven for the existence of δ perfect strategies for all δ > 0 implying the existence of equilibria for every > 0. Using this approach we prove the existence of equilibria for every > 0 for a special class of quitting games. The important technique of...

We analyze existence, uniqueness and properties of equilibria in incompletely discriminating Tullock contests with logistic contest success functions, when contestants are risk averse. We prove that a Nash equilibrium for such a contest exists, but give an example of a symmetric contest with both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria, showing that risk aversion may lead to multiple equilibria. Sy...