This is a study of the representations of subjective expected utility preferences that admit state-dependent incompleteness, and subjective expected utility preferences displaying non-comparability of acts from distinct sources. The notions familiar events and sources are defined and characterized. The relation greater familiarity on sources and increasing familiarity of a source are also defin...

Under expected utility, prudence is equivalent to a positive third derivative of utility and plays a crucial role in precautionary saving behaviour. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) proposed behavioural de nitions of prudence and of higher order risk preferences. The present paper proposes a similar de nition for prudence with respect to ambiguity, i.e., situations in which objective probabilit...

We study the effects of bidder collaboration in all-pay auctions. We analyse both mergers, where the remaining players are aware of the agreement between the cooperating participants, and collusion, where the remaining players are unaware of this agreement. We examine two scenarios: the sum-profit model where the auctioneer obtains the sum of all submitted bids, and the max-profit model of crow...

This paper presents results from the second phase of a longitudinal study of retirement. Data were gathered through interviews with 29 participants (65 to 66 years of age) who had previously been interviewed when they were 63 to 64 years of age and still working. Data were analyzed by characterizing each subject's narrative about retirement in terms of its narrative slope--progressive, stabilit...

Introduction Propose and provide foundations for a preference model set in an explicitly dynamic framework with uncertainty where: DM is sensitive to ambiguity ambiguity attitude is separated from ambiguity ‡exibility in ambiguity attitude and in scope of ambiguity preferences are dynamically consistent discounted expected utility is a special case beliefs are updated over time

We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein’s (1982) game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers. Journal of Economic Literature Cl...

The rst section recalls the de nitions of risk apportionment. Section 2 introduces notation and section 3 de nes ambiguity apportionment. Section 4 gives results for secondorder expected utility and multiplier preferences and in section 5, a way to adapt the de nitions to ambiguity models with non-expected utility under risk is proposed. Finally, section 6 presents simple models of precautionar...