Extending the notion of contractual pricing introduced by Makowski and Ostroy (2003) to economies with moral hazard, this paper develops a model of team formation and organized competition with three main contributions. Firstly, a team’s organization is defined as an allocation of (public or private) commodities together with incentive compatible actions and information to its members. Secondly...

We study an alternating offers bargaining model in which the set of possible utility pairs evolves through time in a non-stationary, but smooth manner. In general, there exists a multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria. However, we show that in the limit as the time interval between two consecutive offers becomes arbitrarily small, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Furthermo...

We consider a general equilibrium model with a production externality (e.g. pollution), where the regulator does not observe firm productivity shocks. We examine quantity (permit) regulation and price (tax) regulation. The quantity of permits issued by the regulator are independent of the productivity shock, since shocks are unobserved. Price regulation implies use of the regulated input is an ...

In this paper we study an alternating-offers bargaining model in which the set of possible utility pairs evolves through time in a non-stationary, but smooth manner. In general there exists a multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria. However, we show that in the limit as the time interval between two consecutive offers becomes arbitrarily small, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibri...

This article analyzes an asymmetric rent-seeking contest with free riding where valuation on the prize (rent) and effectiveness of rent-seeking effort may differ among agents and the victory of an agent may not exclude some agents other than the winner of the contest to consume the prize of the contest. After proving the unique existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, this article examines ...

Rotten Kids with Bad Intentions We examine a "Rotten Kid" model (Becker 1974) where a player with social preferences interacts with an egoistic player. We assume that social preferences are intention-based rather than outcome-based. In a very general multi-stage setting we show that any equilibrium must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players, endogenously generating negative emotions ...

Transactions at non-equilibrium prices are “false trades”. Under standard assumptions, markets without false trading produce Pareto-efficient outputs. This paper demonstrates graphically the complications created when false trades occur, showing that quantities produced deviate from Pareto-efficient quantities except under unique conditions. In a general equilibrium framework, this spills over ...

CGE models are utilized for the evaluation of trade policy reforms, yet they are typically highly aggregated, limiting their usefulness to trade negotiators interested in impacts at the tariff line. Partial Equilibrium (PE) models used for disaggregate analysis lack the benefits of an economy-wide analysis required to examine the overall impact of trade policy reforms. This suggests the need fo...

We extend the Lucas economy (1978) to the case of preferences a la Kreps-Porteus (1978) when the dividend (fruit) process follows a geometric Brownian Motion. In the representative agent case, the equilibrium price reveals a two-stage mechanism. First, the risk averse agent adjusts downward the average growth rate of dividends to incorporate uncertainty. Then, the e¤ect of the intertemporal ela...