We study behavior and equilibrium selection in experimental network games. We vary two important factors: (a) actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and (b) subjects have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Play conforms strongly to the theoretical predictions, providing an impressive behavioral confirmation of the Galeo...

We study how social networks change due to an exogenous intervention, such as an expansion in financial access, and we show how to estimate the effect of these network changes on individual outcomes (intervention spillovers). We use a unique panel dataset that contains detailed information on the network of informal financial transactions before and after a field experiment that randomized acce...

We have developed an evolutionary game model, where agents can choose between two forms of social participation: interaction via online social networks and interaction by exclusive means of face-to-face encounters. We illustrate the societal dynamics that the model predicts, in light of the empirical evidence provided by previous literature. We then assess their welfare implications. We show th...

In this paper, we discuss the formation of collaboration networks among …rms that are located in a circular city. The model is a two-stage game. In the …rst stage, …rms form collaboration links, and in the second stage the …rms engage in price competition. The model in the second stage is a generalization of Salop’s (1979) model. We examine pairwise stability of networks and a stochastic networ...

It is common to de…ne a network organization as one that is fast and ‡exible in adapting to changes in the underlying environment. But besides the short-run advantages of adaptability, fast changes in the structure of the organization can also be detrimental in the longer run. This happens because a widespread knowledge of the organization’s structure is important in channelling (and thus speed...

We design a laboratory experiment to investigate two-sided link formation in a setting where payo s are heterogeneous and depend on direct links only. Our link formation rule is decentralized and players can make link o ers and counter-o ers, as in a Beckerian marriage market. The game is designed in such a way that if participants play a myopic payo -maximizing best response, it leads to an un...

This paper examines the steady states of an overlapping generations economy with a given distribution of household locations over a one-dimensional interval. Parents decide whether or not to educate their children. Educational decisions are affected by location: There are local complementarities in investment incentives stemming from aspirations formation, learning spillovers, or local public g...

The present paper thoroughly explores second-best efficient allocations in an adverse selection insurance economy. We start from a natural extension of the classical model, assuming less than perfect risk perceptions. We propose first and second welfare theorems, by means of which we describe efficiencyenhancing policies. Notions of weak and strong adverse selection are promising for interpreti...

The behavior of exchange rate in various exchange markets is not seemingly predictable, while there are different forecasting methods to do so. One of these methods is to use fractals to identify exchange rate behavior. This paper has made attempts to explore the properties of fractals in Iran’s exchange market in order to it can predict and analyze the trend of exchange rate. Accordingly, th...

factor demand behavior such as energy demand has an important role in the economic analysis. this issue is a major concern in the developing countries (e.g. iran) which are benefited from vast energy resources. in this paper, the third generation of factor demand models is used to analyze the behavior of capital adjustment in the iranian manufacturing industries. the dataset covers the two-digi...