This supplement contains extended formal results for Daley and Sadowski (2015) (henceforth DS15). Specifically, §S.1 establishes that in Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) games, the model of DS15 is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of other-regarding preferences: altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 19...

We prove several results showing that the algebraic $K$ -theory of valuation rings behaves as though such were regular Noetherian, in particular an analogue Geisser–Levine theorem. also give some new proofs known concerning cdh descent -theory.

This supplement contains extended formal results for Daley and Sadowski (2016) (henceforth DS16). Specifically, §S.1 establishes that in Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) games, the model of DS16 is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of other-regarding preferences: altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 19...