this paper represents a complete survey on generation companies’ (gencos’) optimal bidding strategy problem in restructured power markets. in this regard after an introduction to competitive electricity markets, concept of optimal bidding strategy is presented. considering large amount of works accomplished in this area a novel classification is implemented in order to categorize the existing d...

Right now employment of polices and tools to decrease the carbon emission through electricity generation from renewable resources is one of the most important problem in energy policy. Tradable Green Certificate (TGC) is an economics mechanism to support green power generation. Any country has the challenge to choose an appropriate policy and mechanism for design and implementation of TGC. The ...

In today’s restructured environment, congestion management plays an essential role in power system operation. Different methods are presented and discussed in this respect for congestion management in short-term and long-term intervals. It is attempted in the present paper to investigate the impact mechanism of FACTS devices and demand response programs together with generation re-dispatch as s...

This paper studies the impact of competition on the degree of inefficiency in lemons markets. More precisely, we characterize the second-best mechanism (i.e., the optimal mechanism with private information) in a stylized lemons market with finite numbers of buyers and sellers. We then study the relationship between the degree of efficiency of the second-best mechanism and market competitiveness...

The paper studies on the core philosophy and algorithm of the designing economic mechanisms theory, a new algorithm of designing incentive compatible power market mechanisms is proposed, a generation side power market mechanism model which has features of inventive compatibility, informationally efficient and decentralized decision is constructed. The power market based on the designing economi...

We study double auction market design where the market maker wants to maximize its total revenue by buying low from the sellers and selling high to the buyers. We consider a Bayesian setting where buyers and sellers have independent probability distributions on the values of products on the market. For the simplest setting where each seller has one kind of item that can be sold in whole to a bu...