This paper studies wage bargaining in a simple economy in which both employed and unemployed workers search for better jobs. The axiomatic Nash bargaining solution and standard strategic bargaining solutions are inapplicable because the set of feasible payoffs is nonconvex. I instead develop a strategic model of wage bargaining between a single worker and firm that is applicable to such an envi...

Duopoly game theory is applied to the wood industrial markets (sawnwood and pulpwood markets) in the North of Iran. The Nash equilibrium and the dynamic properties of the system based on marginal adjustments are determined. The probability that the Nash equilibrium will be reached is almost zero. The dynamical properties of sawnwood and pulpwood prices derived via the duopoly game model are fou...

We extend Nash's bargaining theory to non-convex and coalitional problems. This paper investigates the implications of Nash-like axioms for bilateral problems and the properties of consistency and converse consistency over multilateral settings. The result is a characterization of the Nash set of NTU games, defined as the solution concept where each pair of players is splitting the gains from t...

This paper considers the problem of disruption risk management in global supply chains. We consider a supply chain with two participants, who face interdependent losses resulting from supply chain disruptions such as terrorist strikes and natural hazards. The HarsanyiSelten-Nash bargaining framework is used to model the choice of supply chain participants of risk mitigation incentives. The barg...

Wediscuss two support results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Strategic interaction determines an allocation of objects, so that evaluationwith individual utilities constitute the payoffs in the derived games. These allocations of objects are obtained through individual demand in a specific market for objects. For ...

For two-person complete-information strategic games with transferable utility, all major variable-threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide. This confluence of solutions by luminaries such as Nash, Harsanyi, Raiffa, and Selten, is more than mere coincidence. Staying in the class of two-person games with transferable unility, the present paper presents a more complete theory that expa...

In the retail industry, customer value has become key to maintaining competitive advantages. era of new retail, is not only affected by product price, but it also closely related innovations, such as value-added services and unique business models. this paper, we study joint innovation investment pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts value. We ...

This paper considers the problem of disruption risk management in global supply chains. We consider a supply chain with two participants, who face interdependent losses resulting from supply chain disruptions such as terrorist strikes and natural hazards. The Harsanyi–Selten–Nash bargaining framework is used to model the supply chain participants’ choice of risk mitigation investments. The barg...

The reduced game relevant for the consistency of the prekernel is used to reinterpret this solution concept in a way that makes it independent of interpersonal utility comparisons. Based on this reinterpretation, a non-cooperative model is presented that yields in stationary equilibria the prekernel (kernel) for the class of monotonic transferable utility games. Next, we apply the same non-coop...

We analyze an inÞnitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game with an endogenous reversion point. In each session a new dollar is divided among three legislators according to the proposal of a randomly recognized member — if a majority prefer so — or according to previous period’s allocation otherwise. We characterize a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of this game and study the resultant e...