We analyze the risk level chosen by agents who have private information regarding their quality. We show that even risk-neutral agents will choose risk strategically to enhance their reputation in the market, and that such choices will be influenced by the mix of other agents’ types. Assuming that the market has no strong prior about whether the agents are good or bad, good agents will choose l...

We model a run on a financial market, in which each risk-neutral investor fears having to liquidate shares after a run, but before prices can recover back to fundamental values. To avoid having to possibly liquidate shares at the marginal post-run price—in which case the risk-averse market-making sector will already hold a lot of share inventory and thus be more reluctant to absorb additional s...

This paper investigates the effect of different risk attitudes on the financial decisions of two insiders trading in the stock market. We consider a static version of the Kyle (1985) model with two insiders. Insider 1 is risk neutral while insider 2 is risk averse with negative exponential utility. First, we prove the existence of a unique linear equilibrium. Second, we obtain somewhat surprisi...

We study a dynamic insurance market with asymmetric information and ex post moral hazard. In our model, the insurance buyer’s risk type is unknown to the insurer; moreover, the buyer has the option of not reporting losses. The insurer sets premia according to the buyer’s risk rating that is computed via Bayesian estimation based on buyer’s history of reported claims. Accordingly, the buyer has ...

This paper establishes links between approaches to portfolio optimization and derivative pricing as to be found in He & Pearson (1991), Karatzas (1996), Pliska (1997), Föllmer & Schweizer (1989), Schweizer (1995), Davis (1997), Fritelli & Bellini (1997), and Kallsen (1998) in a finite market setting. We show that expected utility maximization problems are related in a natural way to the choice ...

We consider a closed economy where a risk neutral bank competes with a competitive bond market. Firms can finance a risky project either by a bank credit or by issuing a bond which is directly sold to risk averse investors who also hold safe deposits at the bank. We show that the bank tends to allocate more capital to lower quality projects but there are some interesting qualifications. If the ...

A balance sheet structure including fixed assets, net working capital and risky long-term debt leads to a model for option pricing of the firm’s equity. Each of the financial components constitutes a source of risk. A hedge based on three distinct options and the stock enables risk neutral valuation and avoids the problems of lack of tradability of the assets and market incompleteness reflected...

We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay-to-performance ratio is less than one even when...

The relation between physical probabilities (rating) and risk-neutral probabilities (pricing) is derived in a large market with a quasi-factor structure. Factor sensitivities and default probabilities can be estimated for all kinds of credits on historical rating data. Since factor prices are obtainable from market data, the model allows the pricing of non-marketable credits and structured prod...

We provide a self-contained analysis of a class of continuous-time stochastic mortality models that have gained popularity in the last few years. We describe some of their advantages and limitations, examining whether their features survive equivalent changes of measures. This is important when using the same model for both market-consistent valuation and risk management of life insurance liabi...