According to Sparse views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character experience is exhausted by experiential presentation ‘low-level’ properties such as (in case vision) shapes, colors, and textures Whereas, according Rich can also sometimes involve experiencing ‘high-level’ natural kinds, artefactual causal relations, linguistic meanings, moral properties. An important dialectical tool in...

If phenomenal experience is a physical phenomenon, it must occur at some spatial and temporal location. Can consciousness be situated in such a strong sense? Although the importance of embodiment and situatedness is often mentioned, most neuroscientists and philosophers alike consider phenomenal experience as an outcome of neural activity. In this paper, the question I would raise is whether th...

Depressive symptoms are often found to be associated with the number of imagined positive and negative future episodes. Whereas most previous studies investigated the number of imagined events within a limited time period, our study focused on the phenomenal nature of future episodes and their relationships to depressive symptoms, as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). Nonclinical ...

Panpsychism, the view that the phenomenal experiences of macrophysical items, like ourselves, are nothing over and above combinations of phenomenal experiences of microphysical items, seems to be committed to various sorts of mental combination: in order to yield experiences such as our own, it seems that experiences, subjects, and phenomenal characters would have to mentally combine. The combi...

This paper compares and contrasts Michael Huemer’s Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism with Husserl’s well-known Principle of All Principles. Despite some similarities, I argue that the two are quite different. I examine several cases in which the theories provide different assessments of a belief’s epistemic status, and argue that Husserl’s gives the correct answer in each case. I also argue ...

OBJECTIVE In the past decade, much has been written about 'the hard problem' of consciousness in the philosophy of mind. However, a separate hard problem faces the scientific study of consciousness. The problem arises when distinguishing the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and the neural constitution of consciousness. Here, I explain this correlation/constitution distinction and the pr...

This paper argues that it is possible for suffering to occur in the absence of phenomenal consciousness − in the absence of a certain sort of experiential subjectivity, that is. (‘Phenomenal’ consciousness is the property that some mental states possess, when it is like something to undergo them, or when they have subjective feels, or possess qualia.) So even if theories of phenomenal conscious...

Deviant phenomenal knowledge is knowing what it’s like to have experiences of, e.g., red without actually having had experiences of red. Such a knower is a deviant. Some physicalists have argued and some anti-physicalists have denied that the possibility of deviants undermines anti-physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. The current paper presents new arguments defending the deviant-based attac...