A proposer requires the approval of a veto player to change status quo. Preferences are single peaked. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer's ideal point. We study Proposer's optimal mechanism without transfers. Vetoer given menu, or delegation set, choose from. The set balances extent compromise with risk veto. Under reasonable conditions, "full delegation" optimal: can any action between quo an...

We address the problem of secure and verifiable delegation of general pairing computation. We first analyze some recently proposed pairing delegation schemes and present several attacks on their security and/or verifiability properties. In particular, we show that none of these achieve the claimed security and verifiability properties simultaneously. We then provide a fully verifiable secure de...

In many application domains, there are certain aspects that cannot be modeled in an adequate way by using generalization although it may be the concept of choice at first sight. Sometimes common associations such as interaction or aggregation will fail as well. In those cases, delegation often proves to allow for an appropriate abstraction. While delegation has been an important concept in diff...

We study the choice of a principal to either delegate decision group careerist experts or consult them individually and keep decision-making power. Our model predicts trade-off between information acquisition aggregation. On one hand, expected benefit from being informed is larger in case are consulted individually. Hence, acquire same amount information, depending on cost than delegation. othe...

This paper explores how delegation can be used as a signal to sustain cooperation. I consider static principal–agent model with two tasks, one resembling coordination game. If there is asymmetric information about the agent’s type, principal high private belief delegate first task signal. also supported by forward induction argument. However, in laboratory setting, this equilibrium chosen only ...

Abstract This article develops a non-cooperative game with managerial quantity-setting firms in which owners choose whether to delegate output and abatement decisions managers through contract based on emissions (conventionally denoted as ‘green’ delegation, GD) instead of sales (sales SD), the government levies an tax incentivise firms’ emissions-reduction actions. First, it compares Nash equi...