Cybersecurity plays an increasing role in today’s digital space, and its methods must keep pace with the changes. Both public private sector researchers have put efforts into strengthening security of networks by proposing new approaches. This paper presents a method to solve game theory model defining contents payoff matrix incorporating honeypots defense strategy. Using probabilistic approach...

This article studies security decisions of identical plant-controller systems, when their security is interdependent due to network induced risks. Each plant is modeled by a discrete-time stochastic linear system, with the systems controlled over a shared communication network. We formulate the problem of security choices of the individual system operators (also called players) as a non-coopera...

Cryptographic primitives are fundamental for information security: they are used as basic components for cryptographic protocols or public-key cryptosystems. In many cases, their security proofs consist in showing that they are reducible to computationally hard problems. Those reductions can be subtle and tedious, and thus not easily checkable. On top of the proof assistant Coq, we had implemen...

Algorithms for computing game-theoretic solutions have recently been applied to a number of security domains. However, many of the techniques developed for compact representations of security games do not extend to Bayesian security games, which allow us to model uncertainty about the attacker’s type. In this paper, we introduce a general framework of catcher-evader games that can capture Bayes...

Attacker-defender Stackelberg games have been used in several deployed applications of game theory for infrastructure security. Security resources of the defender are game-theoretically allocated to prevent a strategic attacker from using surveillance to learn and exploit patterns in the allocation. Existing work on security games assumes that the defender honestly displays her real security re...

There has been significant recent research interest in utilizing leaderfollower Stackelberg game in security applications. Indeed, Stackelberg games are seen at many deployed applications [6]: ARMOR at Los Angeles International Airport, IRIS for Federal Air Marshals Service, GUARDS for the Transportation Security Administration, and TRUSTS for the Los Angeles Metro Rail System [3] (under evalua...

The proloferation of RFID tags enhances everyday activities, such as by letting us reference the price, origin and circulation route of speci c goods. On the other hand, this lecel of traceability gives rise to new privacy issues and the topic of developing cryptographic protocols for RFIDtags is garnering much attention. A large amount of research has been conducted in this area. In this paper...

Conservation agencies around the world are tasked with protecting endangered wildlife from poaching. Despite their substantial efforts, however, species are continuing to be poached to critical status and, in some cases, extinction. In South Africa, rhino poaching has seen a recent escalation in frequency; while only 122 rhinos were poached in 2009, a record 1215 rhinos were poached in 2014 (ap...

We study users’ incentives to become cybercriminals when network security is interdependent. We present a game-theoretic model in which each player (i.e., network user) decides his type, honest or malicious. Honest users represent law-abiding network users, while malicious users represent cybercriminals. After deciding on their types, the users make their security choices. We will follow [29], ...

In Part I an expository overview of the basic concepts of the theory of games was presented. The different forms for representing a game were noted and the various solutions were discussed and illustrated. Here we examine the highly different approaches adopted by those who regard themselves as game theorists and by those others who utilize game theory We examine the four most important distinc...