We axiomatically characterize the class of pairwise irresolute social choice functions that are group-strategyproof according to Kelly’s preference extension. The class is narrow but contains a number of appealing Condorcet extensions such as the minimal covering set and the bipartisan set, thereby answering a question raised independently by Barberà (1977a) and Kelly (1977). These functions fu...

We determine the quality of randomized social choice mechanisms in a setting in which the agents have metric preferences: every agent has a cost for each alternative, and these costs form a metric. We assume that these costs are unknown to the mechanisms (and possibly even to the agents themselves), which means we cannot simply select the optimal alternative, i.e. the alternative that minimizes...

A successful social interaction often requires on-line and active construction of an ever-changing mental-model of another person's beliefs, expectations, emotions, and desires. It also requires the ability to maintain focus, problem-solve, and flexibly pursue goals in a distraction-rich environment, as well as the ability to take-turns and inhibit inappropriate behaviors. Many of these tasks r...

Human-Robot Interaction literature frequently uses Gaussian distributions within navigation costmaps to model proxemic constraints around humans. While it has proven to be effective in several cases, this approach is often hard to tune to get the desired behavior, often because of unforeseen interactions between different elements in the costmap. There is, as far as we are aware, no general str...

We characterize the class of Arrovian Social Welfare Functions (ASWFs) as integer solutions to a collection of linear inequalities. Many of the classical possibility, impossibility, and characterization results can be derived in a simple and unified way from this integer program. Among the new results we derive is a characterization of preference domains that admit a nondictatorial, neutral ASW...

Th e In st it u t e of E con om ic Resea r ch H it ot su ba shi Un iversity Ku n it a ch i, Tokyo, 186-8603 J a pa n Summary. In this paper, criticizing the welfarist's framework in traditional welfare economics which provides a rather limited perspective for social evaluation, we propose a more comprehensive framework in which extended social ordering functions (ESOFs) are introduced. In this ...

It is one of the central doctrines for ”rational” decision making that an agent should be forward-looking and not be bound by things already gone. We argue that this is not an appealing principle for collective decision making, and that things already gone have necessary and substantive roles. We consider a dynamic process of social welfare orderings explicitly, and propose a discipline which i...

,The importance of knowledge as a basis for social power has been noted by a number of scholars,' but less well appreciated is the fact that control of knowledge is central to development and maintenance of power. The knowledge industry, of which mass communication is part, currently accounts for more than a fourth of the gross national product and attests to the social importance of the demand...

Travis Hirschi's control or social bonding theory argues that those persons who have strong and abiding attachments to conventional society (in the form of attaciuIlcnts, involvement, investment, and belief) are less likely to deviate than persons who have weak or shallow bonds. Later, Gottfredson and Hirschi moved away from the social bond as the primary factor in deviance, and toward an empha...