The urban development process displays regressive tacit-dominant knowledge areas and their tacit level would impede their movements during multi-level knowledge transfers among stakeholders. The accuracy of a knowledge may be distorted when recipient stakeholders fail to understand a specific knowledge for its purpose. Earlier studies by the authors had highlighted complex yet dynamic environme...

The problem of revenue leakages through transfer pricing remains unabated, and an examination possible causes is a continuum. This study provides nuanced the interaction between MNCs tax consultants (TCs) which treated with mixed views in existing literature. role TCs aiding abetting taxpayers into abusive (TP) has implications for policy especially situations where administration systems are p...

Traditional supply chain literature on contracting only considers agents’ economic motivation. Nowadays, with the development of behavioral economics, social preference theory has been widely used in research. These preferences are distinct from motivation and will influence behaviors chain. Agents make decisions based not self-interests but also interests others, reciprocity, fairness. This pa...

this paper discovers the necessary variables need for creating models for tacit knowledge acquisition, especially in medical care services. the case studied here, was knowledge of diagnosing and time of delivery in twin pregnancy with nuchal translucency screening. this paper covers the empirical work undertaken on semi-structured interview based on thematic analysis. with regard of theoretical...

A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents’ collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents, including both uncorrelated and correlated types. In those circumstances, any payoff the principal can attain in the absence of collusion, including the secondbest level, can be attained in the presence of collusion in a way ...

This paper explores the effects that collusion can have in newspaper markets where firms compete for advertising as well as for readership. We compare three modes of competition: i) competition in the advertising and the reader market, ii) semi-collusion over advertising (with competition in the reader market), and iii) (full) collusion in both the advertising and the reader market. We find tha...

In this paper we address the question of collusion in mechanisms under asymmetric information by assuming that one of the colluding parties offers a side contract to the other one. We develop a methodology to analyze collusion as an informed principal problem. We show that if collusion occurs after the agents accept or reject the principal’s offer, the dominant-strategy implementation of the op...

In the knowledge management domain, the conversion of tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge is critical because it is a prerequisite to the knowledge amplification process wherein knowledge becomes part of an organization’s knowledge network. Moreover, this process is strategically important because it enhances an organization’s ability to create new knowledge that is inevitably expressed throu...

We analyze a principal-supervisor-two agent hierarchy with supervisory efforts, provide a characterization of the equilibrium of the game, and show which regime improves efficiency between the collusion-proof regime and the lateral collusion one, under the assumptions that the principal is less informed, and that the side-trade is costly. By coping with the trade-off between the value of inform...

Online rating systems are subject to malicious behaviors mainly by posting unfair rating scores. Users may try to individually or collaboratively promote or demote a product. Collaborating unfair rating ’collusion’ is more damaging than individual unfair rating. Although collusion detection in general has been widely studied, identifying collusion groups in online rating systems is less studied...