This paper studies the effect of home-host country distance on the choice of governance mode in service offshoring. Using a Transaction Cost Economics approach, we explore the comparative costs of the hierarchical and contractual models to show that different dimensions of distance (geographic, cultural and institutional), because they generate different types of uncertainties, impact offshore ...

We propose a method for estimating substitute and lost demand when only sales and product availability data are observable, not all products are displayed in all periods (e.g., due to stockouts or availability controls), and the seller knows its aggregate market share. The model combines a multinomial logit (MNL) choice model with a nonhomogeneous Poisson model of arrivals over multiple periods...

if the agent, who has the right to appoint a proxy, exercises his right and appoints another person for pursuing the subject of agency, the appointed person is not the agent of the appointer; rather, he is regarded as the indirect agent of the client. therefore, if the object of agency is conclusion of a transaction contract and the indirect proxy concludes it, that [contract] belongs to the cl...

Recently firms have been reconsidering offshoring decisions, and reshoring activities back from offshore locations to domestic locations. The aim of this paper is develop a framework for understanding location governance choice in the decision. Employing eclectic paradigm, resource-based view transaction cost economics as theoretical basis, research highlights value integrating location-specifi...

ÐWe investigate the performance implications of providing transaction atomicity for firm-deadline real-time applications operating on distributed data. Using a detailed simulation model, the real-time performance of a representative set of classical transaction commit protocols is evaluated. The experimental results show that data distribution has a significant influence on real-time performanc...

The concept of “contract” has similar but not identical interpretations for lawyers and economists. Both Economic and Legal theories distinguish transactions from contracts based on the possibility to rely on court enforcement. Formal and informal promises are enforceable by courts, however there is not a clear distinction between a contract and an agreement since agents do not know a priori th...