This paper studies a relational contracting model in which the agent is protected by a limited liability constraint. The agent’s effort is his private information and affects the output stochastically. We characterize the optimal relational contract and compare the dynamics of the relationship with that under the optimal long-term contract. Under the optimal relational contract, the relationshi...

We consider some discrete and continuous dynamics in a Banach space involving a non expansive operator J and a corresponding family of strictly contracting operators Φ(λ, x) := λJ( 1−λ λ x) for λ ∈ ]0, 1]. Our motivation comes from the study of two-player zero-sum repeated games, where the value of the n-stage game (resp. the value of the λ-discounted game) satisfies the relation vn = Φ( 1 n , ...

Ali Fattahi Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California 90095, [email protected] Sriram Dasu Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California 90089, [email protected] Reza Ahmadi Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California 9009...

one of the most important duties of insured in the insurance contract, is to inform the insurer, fully and accurately. this obligation arises in three stages:before conclusion of contract, during the contract and after occurrence of the insured event. the review shows that the insured’s duty before conclusion of contract is reduced from a primary obligation to a secondary one. this means that i...

Weather risk causes uncertain crop yield and price further influences the willingness of farmers to participate in contract farming honour contract. In this study, we investigate optimal decisions for between a profit-maximizing manufacturer multiple identical under weather risk, using game-theoretical approach. We discuss two different cases. first case, sets ensure any condition. While second...