Multi-unit auctions are being employed by public agencies to allocate resources and to purchase services. These auctions resolve the lumpy bid problem inherent in single-unit auctions by allowing bidders to submit a supply or demand schedule. However, the choice of pricing formats for multi-unit auctions is controversial. Neither economic theory nor laboratory experiments depict a complete pict...

If n colluding oligopolists all have the cost function C(qi) = c qi, then it will not be possible to uniquely allocate among the firms the monopoly output that maximizes their joint profit. Similarly, if all plants of an n-plant firm have the cost function C(qi) = c qi, then it will not be possible to uniquely allocate the firm’s optimal output among the n plants. This paper identifies the nece...

The conventional economic paradigm assumes that tastes and preferences are exogenous to the economic system, and that the economic problem consists of optimally satisfying those preferences. Tastes and preferences usually do not change rapidly and, in the short term, this assumption makes sense. Sustainability is an inherently long-term problem and in the long run it does not make sense to assu...

Within an incomplete contracts theoretic framework, we examine the consequences of contract renegotiation for contract design/enforcement and training market efficiency. Specifically, we show how the imposition of either firing costs or exit costs can bind together employers and employees in longer-lasting employment relationships that allow both agents to amortise their training investment. Ne...

Societies are characterized by customs governing the allocation of non-market goods such as marital partnerships. We explore how such customs affect the educational investment decisions of young singles and the subsequent joint labor supply decisions of partnered couples. We consider two separate matching paradigms for agents with heterogeneous abilities one where partners marry for money and t...

Although the celebrated Vickrey auction is strategy-proof and guaranteed to achieve an efficient allocation in a singleobject auction, if there exists no outside party (i.e., a seller or an auctioneer) with the right to collect the payment, the collected payment will be wasted. Redistribution mechanisms try to redistribute the payment to participating agents as much as possible without violatin...

the article page for additional materials and author disclosure statement(s). Healthcare and education share commonalities in mission, financing, and empirical regularities. Both are central to allowing people to perform at their capabilities. Both are often provided by, or subsidized by, government. Heterogeneity— the idea that interventions such as AP classes or bypass surgery may have differ...

Due to the public good character of protective measures against natural disasters events, their allocation is very often in the realm of bureaucratic and expert agencies. Based on the economic theory of bureaucracy the behavior of a bureau providing the good ”protection against natural hazards” is analysed. The existing model is extended by further institutional constraints accounting for socie...

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t JEL classification: C70 D44 D61 Keywords: Online auctions Posted price selling Buy-it-now Allocative inefficiency Random matching eBay auctions In an auction-style listing at eBay, sellers have the option to set a posted price (also known as buy-it-now price), which allows buyers to instantly purchase an item before the start of the auction. This paper prov...

INTRODUCTION International investment in the response to HIV and AIDS has plateaued and its future level is uncertain. With many countries committed to ending the epidemic, it is essential to allocate available resources efficiently over different response periods to maximize impact. The objective of this study is to propose a technique to determine the optimal allocation of funds over time acr...