This paper analyzes the role of communication between firms in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which firms receive an imperfect private signal of a common value i.i.d. demand shock. It is shown that firms can use stochastic, inter-temporal market sharing as a perfect substitute for communication in low demand states. Therefore, partial communication in high demand states is sufficient t...

This paper analyzes the role of communication between firms in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which firms receive an imperfect private signal of a common value i.i.d. demand shock. Communication allows firms to coordinate on the most collusive price and it eliminates the possibility of undetectable price cuts. It is shown that firms can use stochastic intertemporal market sharing as a ...

In the last few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when non-cooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass (2013) call translucent players. Typically, play...

This is a chapter of a book manuscript entitled Topics in Microeconomics . Comments, criticism and recommendations are welcome. The chapter starts with an elementary introduction to the three basic oligopoly theories, associated with the names of Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg. These theories are then covered in depth, including generalizations, extensions to entry, exit, and capacity choice...

Economic theory predicts that in a first-price auction with equal and observable valuations, bidders earn zero profits. Theory also predicts that if valuations are not common knowledge, then since it is weakly dominated to bid your valuation, bidders will bid less and earn positive profits. Hence, rational players in an auction game should prefer less public information. We are perhaps more use...

In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are randomly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run predictions are minimal sets that...

In order to maximize benefits, oligopolistic competition often occurs in contemporary society. Establishing the mathematical models reveal law of market has become a vital topic. current study, on basis earlier publications, we propose new fractional-order Bertrand duopoly game model incorporating both nonidentical time delays. The dynamics involving existence and uniqueness, non-negativeness, ...

In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are randomly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run predictions are minimal sets that...