We examine the role of founders as directors by examining executive compensation, CEO retention policies, and M&A decisions in firms where founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEO than other firms. Pay for performance sensitivity for non-founder CEOs in founder-director firms is al...

External network ties between CEOs and directors in major U.S. corporations may limit the e¤ectiveness of internal corporate governance. Using comprehensive biographical data on the managers and directors of S&P 1500 companies, we identify connections between directors and their …rms’CEOs through external directorships, past employment, education, and other activities (e.g. golf clubs or charit...

This paper studies the connection between CEO experience and Vietnamese listed firms’ capital adjustment behavior. In context of Vietnam, we find that experienced CEOs slow down speed obtaining desired ratio debt, after analyzing a sample 694 public companies from 2010 to 2019. pattern can be seen for both under- over-the-target enterprises when leverage is measured by book market value. Our fi...

BACKGROUND The resource-based view of the firm suggests that organizations must obtain valuable resources from external sources to obtain lasting benefits. Professional associations today exist in every industry and offer resources to assist their affiliates' organizations and individual members. Today, there are more than 23,000 national and 64,000 state, local, and regional professional assoc...

This thesis consists of three essays and studies CEO compensation and mergers and acquisitions in empirical corporate finance. The first essay is sole-authored and is titled ‘The Effect of Social Interactions on Executive Compensation.’ The second essay ‘The Role of Investment Banker Directors in M&A: Can Experts Help?’ is a joint work with Qianqian Huang, Erik Lie, and Ke Yang. The third essay...

A growing body of research offers evidence that CEOs and other top executives show large and persistent person-specific heterogeneity in their management styles. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) document that such person-specific styles explain a substantial fraction of the variation in firms’ capital structures, investment decisions and organizational structures. The idea that CEOs greatly differ in...

We use the resource-based theory and leadership categorization to develop hypotheses about ethnic minority CEO turnover. Using survival analysis, we test find that, as a group, CEOs at US firms experience only half of risk turnover any time do nonethnic CEOs. However, is not spread evenly across subgroups. Asian Hispanic lower than Black share this reduced that consistent with CEOs, but it usef...

The arrival of spring means yet another round in the national debate over executive compensation. But the critics have it wrong. The relentless attention on how much CEOs are paid diverts public attention from the real problem-how CEOs are paid. The authors present an in-depth statistical analysis of executive compensation. The study incorporates data on thousands of CEOs spanning five decades....

Is executive compensation influenced by the composition of the board of directors? About 8% of chief executive officers (CEOs) are reciprocally interlocked with another CEO—the current CEO of firm A serves as a director of firm B and the current CEO of firm B serves as a director of firm A. Roughly 20% of firms have at least one current or retired employee sitting on the board of another firm a...