Any allocation rule that picks only core allocations is manipulable via segmentation. That is, there exists an economy with a coalition of agents such that, once this coalition splits momentarily from the rest of the economy and institutes the allocation rule within itself, no matter which individually rational sub-allocation the complementary coalition picks, when we paste all the agents back ...

This paper surveys the recent literature on the endogenous formation of economic coalitions, in particular, the partition function literature that allows for externalities across coalitions. Various economic coalitions are classified either as coalitions with positive externalities (output cartels, R&D coalitions with spillovers, public-goods (environmental) coalitions, free-trade areas) or as ...

We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. ...

In characteristic function games, an agent can potentially join many different coalitions, and so must choose which coalition to join. To compare each potential coalition, the agents need to calculate a value for each coalition. As the number of coalitions grows exponentially with the number of agents, the burden of requiring every agent to compute all of the values is high. This can be reduced...

We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe (1994; J. Econ. Theory 63: 299–325) to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong to the largest consistent set...

The theoretical literature on common pool problems in fiscal policy suggests that government fragmentation increases public expenditures. In parliamentary regimes, the fragmentation hypothesis refers to (i) coalition governments and (ii) cabinet size. This paper explores the effect of coalition governments and cabinet size on public expenditures with panel data covering all 16 German States ove...

islamic revolution of iran in 1357 united many groups,social castes and associations with different beliefs which all were oppossed to the shah’s regime. islamic revolution of iran like other revolutions did not preserve this coalition and after wining the revolution, this coalition did not continue. according to the teories of kerin berinton, after a revolution’s victory, moderates come to wor...

We consider coalition formation problems for agents with an underlying synergistic graph, where edges between agents represent some vital synergistic link, such as communication, trust, or physical constraints. A coalition is infeasible if its members do not form a connected subgraph, meaning parts of the coalition are isolated from others. Current state-of-the-art coalition formation algorithm...

Coalitions are a central part of economic, political, and social life, and coalition formation has been studied extensively within the mathematical social sciences. Agents (be they humans, robots, or software agents) have preferences over coalitions and, based on these preferences, it is natural to ask which coalitions are expected to form, and which coalition structures are better social outco...