This paper derives the analytics of seller and buyer participation in an auction hosting site, characterizes optimal hosting site pricing and inves­ tigates the nature of competition between two auction houses or hosting sites that are differentiated in the eyes of the bidders. The auction sites earn revenue by setting positive listing fees, trading off the increased revenue per seller from hig...

In 2022, Thailand’s Demand Response (DR) business model was shifting from the Traditional Utility (TU) to Load Aggregator (LA) in accordance with smart grid master plan. This research studied current demand response and mechanism draw possible gaps operations. deals data system owned by individual load aggregator. The aggregators collect meter evaluate adaptations before sending results claim c...

Dominance truthful bidding is one of the most desirable features in auction design. In the offline setting, a common technique for ensuring truthful bidding is to start with the VickreyClarke-Groves(VCG) mechanism. However, many difficulties arise when implementing this scheme to an online auction. The main purpose of this paper is to survey recent literature aimed at designing truthful mechani...

Shill bidding has increased substantially with the explosion in the number of online auctions. For English auctions with conventional intermediation fee schedules and a continuous increment of the bid, sellers may profit from shill bidding, which is illegal. To deter shill bidding, Wang et al.31 designed a mechanism — the shill-deterrent fee schedule (SDFS) which makes shill bidding unprofitabl...

1567-4223/$ see front matter 2011 Elsevier B.V. A doi:10.1016/j.elerap.2011.12.003 ⇑ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (F. Dong), sh [email protected] (H. Xu), [email protected] (D. Majum Shill bidding has become a serious issue for innocent bidders with the growing popularity of online auctions. In this paper, we study the relationship between final prices of online auctions a...

Online auctions with a fixed end-time often experience a sharp increase in bidding towards the end despite using a proxy-bidding format. We provide a novel explanation of this phenomenon under private values. We study a correlated private values environment in which the seller bids in her own auction (shill bidding). Bidders selected randomly from some large set arrive randomly in an auction, t...

The revenue-equivalence theorem' for auctions predicts that expected seller revenue is independent of the bidding rules, as long as equilibrium has the properties that the buyer with the highest reservation price wins and any buyer with the lowest possible reservation price has zero expected surplus. Thus, in particular, the two most common auction institutions-the open "English" auction and th...

Prospective payment encourages managed care organizations to select low-risk patients. This article models an entitlement program utilizing patient-level competitive bidding to mitigate risk selection. Three mechanisms are tested: uniform payment, pure bidding, and a mix of payment and bidding. Results show selection always occurs under optimal uniform payment, but never under either bidding me...

Demand-side management (DSM) is the modification of consumer utilization manner for energy through various methods to smooth their power consumption curve and increase efficiency. Although DSM improves electricity grid stability protects environment, it allows customers reduce costs. The available literature classifies into two different areas: (i) efficiency (EE) (ii) demand response (DR). In ...