A systematic framework for analyzing dynamical attributes of games has not been well-studied except the special class potential or near-potential games. In particular, existing results have shortcomings in determining asymptotic behavior a given dynamics designated game. Although there is large body literature on developing convergent to Nash equilibrium (NE) game, general, an underlying may be...

A basic model of commitment is to convert a game in strategic form into a “leadership game” where one player commits to a strategy to which the other player chooses a best response, with payoffs as in the original game. This paper studies subgame perfect equilibria of such leadership games for the mixed extension of a finite game, where the leader commits to a mixed strategy. In a generic two-p...

A comment on: ‘‘Revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs’’ Eric T. Anderson, Nanda Kumar, and Surendra Rajiv Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208, USA School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, P.O. Box 830688, Richardson, TX 75083-0688, USA NUS Business School, National University of Singapore, BIZ 1, #04-20, 1 ...

Abstract In this paper, we study a model of market with asymmetric information and sticky prices—the dynamic Stackelberg myopic follower infinite time horizon Fujiwara ("Economics Bulletin" 12(12), 1–9 (2006)). We perform comprehensive analysis the equilibria instead concentrating on steady state only. both for open loop feedback structure, which turn out to coincide, compare results Cournot-Na...

This paper demonstrates the quantization of a spatial Cournot duopoly model with product choice, a two stage game focusing on non-cooperation in locations and quantities. With quantization, the players can access a continuous set of strategies, using continuous variable quantum mechanical approach. The presence of quantum entanglement in the initial state identifies a quantity equilibrium for e...

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly market where firms lack perfect knowledge of the market demand function. They use estimated and therefore misspecified demand functions instead and determine their optimal strategies from the corresponding subjective payoff functions. The central issue of this paper is the question under which conditions a firm can learn the true demand function as well as...