We propose an epistemic logic in which knowledge is fully introspective and implies truth, although truth need not imply epistemic possibility. The logic is presented in sequential format and is interpreted in a natural class of partial models, called balloon models. We examine the notions of honesty and circumscription in this logic: What is the state of an agent thatònly knows '' and which ho...

Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is the study of formal logics that reason about knowledge change. In DEL research, events that cause changes in knowledge are called updates. One class of updates—the BMS updates due to Baltag, Moss, and Solecki—has received much attention in the DEL literature because of the joint expressive power of the various BMS Logics based on these updates. There is, however...

We formulate a formal framework in which we combine the theory of dynamic epistemic logic and the theory of games. In particular, we show how we can use tools of dynamic epistemic logic to reason about information change – and in particular, the effect of communication acts – in such a game of imperfect information. We show how this framework allows for the formulation of specific assumptions i...

In this paper, we provide a new axiomatization of the event-model-based Dynamic Epistemic Logic, based on the completeness proof method proposed in [Wang and Cao, 2013]. This axiomatization does not use any of the standard reduction axioms, but naturally captures the essence of the update product. We demonstrate the use of our new axiomatization and the corresponding proof techniques by three s...

Those economists who have emphasized true uncertainty tended to draw an epistemic distinction between ascertainable past and unknowable future. But in one critical respect—in extracting causal relationships—that is not warranted. Whether they are situated the or future, arguments economics depend equally on counterfactual reasoning. Counterfactualizing entails construction of fictitious narrati...

Abstract I offer a detailed discussion of the connections Lani Watson posits in her book The Right to Know between violations person’s epistemic rights on one hand and distinctively forms injustice influentially discussed work Miranda Fricker other. argue that if we specify content relevant (and corresponding duties others) carefully enough, it becomes plausible there is an even tighter relatio...

Abstract Knowledge defeat occurs when a subject knows that p , gains defeater for her belief, and thereby loses knowledge without necessarily losing belief. It’s far from obvious externalists can accommodate putative cases of since belief satisfies the externalist conditions satisfy those even if later I’ll argue virtue reliabilists intuitions via new kind error theory. I in where holds dogmati...