We study the relative equilibria of the limit case of the planar Newtonian 4–body problem when three masses tend to zero, the so-called (1 + 3)–body problem. Depending on the values of the infinitesimal masses the number of relative equilibria varies from ten to fourteen. Always six of these relative equilibria are convex and the others are concave. Each convex relative equilibrium of the (1 + ...

This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belieffree review-strategy equilibria, in repeated games with private monitoring. The payoff set of this class of equilibria is characterized in the limit as the discount factor converges to one for games where players observe statistically independent signals. As an application, we develop a simple sufficient condition for ...

The most important task in non-cooperative Game Theory is the equilibria detection. A computational method is presented in order to detect different types of equilibria. The method is based on generative relations. Generative relations are an algebraic tool for describing game equilibria. The generative relations of Nash, Aumann, Berge-Zhukovskii, Pareto and Lorenz equilibria are presented. The...

Concurrent game structures model multi-player games played on finite graphs where the players simultaneously choose their moves and collectively determine the next state of the game. We extend this model with prices on transitions for each player. We study pure Nash equilibria in this framework where each player’s payoff is the accumulated price of all transitions until reaching their goal stat...

In this paper, we examine the incentives facing candidates in the spatial voting model. We assume that voters' types are independent, but allow for nonidentical distributions across voters. Examining candidate positional equilibria as a function of voter behavior, we nd that what we term p-symmetric strict p-local equilibria when candidates maximize expected plurality are also strict p-local eq...

In this paper, we introduce the notion of set of ε-proper equilibria for a bimatrix game. We define a 0–1 mixed quadratic program to generate a sequence of ε-proper Nash equilibria and show that the optimization results provide reliable indications on strategy profiles that could be used to generate proper equilibria analytically. This approach can be generalized in order to find at least one p...

We study models of credit with limited commitment, which implies endogenous borrowing constraints. We show that there are multiple stationary equilibria, as well as nonstationary equilibria, including some that display deterministic cyclic and chaotic dynamics. There are also stochastic (sunspot) equilibria, in which credit conditions change randomly over time, even though fundamentals are dete...

It is known that generic games within certain collections of infinite-action normal-form games have only essential equilibria. We point to a difficulty in showing that essential equilibria in generic games are (strictly) perfect, and we identify collections of games whose generic members have only essential and (strictly) perfect equilibria. © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

This paper studies stability properties of general switched systems with multiple distinct equilibria. It is shown that, if the dwell time of the switching events is greater than a certain lower bound, then the trajectory of a general switched system with multiple distinct equilibria, where each system is exponentially stable, globally converges to a superset of those equilibria and remains in ...

Theories featuring multiple equilibria are now widespread across many fields of economics. Yet little empirical work has asked if such multiple equilibria are salient features of real economies. We examine this in the context of the Allied bombing of Japanese cities and industries in WWII. We develop a new empirical test for multiple equilibria and apply it to data for 114 Japanese cities in ei...