An interpretative question Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason raises, is how we should understand the relationship between the categories and the socalled ‘logical forms of judgment’ Kant deduces them from. In her Kant and the Capacity to Judge, Béatrice Longuenesse provides an answer to this question. In this thesis, I evaluate Longuenesse’s account by considering its application to a specific gro...

| In epistemological discussions, two doctrines oppose each other: that of a priori knowledge, and that of exclusive empiricism. The a priori view is characterized by the claim that we possess knowledge about nature that is originally contained in reason but comes to actuality only through sensory stimulation. This knowledge, when brought to full consciousness, can be expressed in the form of g...

0. Introduction Many people understand the expression “formal logic” as meaning modern mathematical logic by opposition to traditional logic before the revolution that happened in the second part of the 19 century with Boole, Frege and others. But in fact this expression was created by Kant (see Scholz 1931). Some people like to quote a excerpt of the preface of the second edition of the Critic...

In this paper I discuss two questions. What does Kant understand by mechanical explanation in the Critique of judgment? And why does he think that mechanical explanation is the only type of the explanation of nature available to us? According to the interpretation proposed, mechanical explanations in the Critique of judgment refer to a particular species of empirical causal laws. Mechanical law...

In this article, we propose a consecutive analysis of Kant?s concept liberal thought and the basics institutional structure community, which shape an immutable body all possible logics development social practices thinking within frame world order. For purposes study, methodological premise is that Kantian metaphysics morality, law religion can be considered one primal historic forms theory. Th...

D Beltrán-Valero de Bernabé, H van Bokhoven, E van Beusekom, W Van den Akker, S Kant, W B Dobyns, B Cormand, S Currier, B Hamel, B Talim, H Topaloglu, H G Brunner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...

Kant famously insisted that “the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will” is the supreme principle of morality. Recent interpreters have taken this emphasis on the self-legislation of the moral law as evidence that Kant endorsed a distinctively constructivist conception of morality according to which the moral law is a positive law, created by us. But a closer...