In this paper I analyze how careerist decision makers aggregate and use information provided by others. I find that decision makers who are motivated by reputation concerns tend to ‘anti-herding’, i.e., they excessively contradict public information such as the prior or others’ recommendations. I also find that some decision makers may deliberately act unilaterally and not consult advisers alth...

We explore the constrained efficient observational learning model — as when individuals care about successors, or are so induced by an informationallyconstrained social planner. We find that when the herding externality is correctly internalized in this fashion, incorrect herds still obtain. To describe behaviour in this model, we exhibit a set of indices that capture the privately estimated so...

We provide an empirical analysis of herding behavior in cryptocurrency markets during COVID-19 and periods cyber-attacks, differentiating between fundamental nonfundamental herding. The results show that is driven by information the full sample period cyber-attack days. However, not prevalent outbreak, either when reacting to or information. This finding suggests heterogeneity behaviors partici...

BACKGROUND The Sami are the indigenous ethnic population of northern Scandinavia. Their health condition is poorly known, although the knowledge has improved over the last decade. OBJECTIVES The aim was to review the current information on mortality, diseases, and risk factor exposure in the Swedish Sami population. DESIGN Health-related research on Sami cohorts published in scientific jour...

Reindeer husbandry is a form of pastoralism where vast areas are used as forage ranges throughout the year. The productivity of the reindeer industry in Sweden is affected by a multitude of factors on different geographical and temporal scales. Our aim was to find combinations of factors characterizing the environmental conditions for reindeer husbandry in the 51 herding districts in Sweden, wh...

We analyze a game theoretic model of social learning about a consumption good with endogenous timing and heterogeneous accuracy of private information. We show that if individuals value their reputation for the degree to which they are informed, this reduces the incentive to learn by observing others and exacerbates the incentive to consume the good before others, i.e., to attempt to be an “opi...