There is a large literature aimed at characterizing the social choice functions that can be implemented in Bayes Nash equilibria. This literature typically takes agents’information as exogenously given and …xed throughout the analysis. While for some problems this may be appropriate, the assumption is problematic for others. A typical analysis, relying on the revelation principle, maximizes som...

Application of Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms Design Theory (Self-adjusting, Effective/Efficient Mechanisms) in the Seventh National Development Planning

The conflict between Pareto optimality and incentive compatibility, that is, the fact that some Pareto optimal (efficient) allocations are not incentive compatible is a fundamental fact in information economics, mechanism design and general equilibrium with asymmetric information. This important result was obtained assuming that the individuals are expected utility maximizers. Although this ass...

We characterize incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions with multi-dimensional types. An allocation mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it is nondecreasing in marginal utilities (NDMU). The notion of incentive compatibility we adopt is dominant strategy in private value models and ex post incentive compatibility in models with interdependent values. NDMU is the following req...

We consider a simple case of team production, where a set of workers have to contribute a single input (say labour) and then share the joint output amongst themselves. Different incentive issues arise when the skills as well as the levels of effort expended by workers are not publicly observable. We study one of these issues in terms of a very simple model in which two types of workers, skilled...

We study collaborative resource planning arises when resource managers need to coordinate their schedule with a group of internal or external customers. We design a “schedule selection game” where all participating agents state their scheduling preferences via a valuation scheme, and the mechanism selects the Þnal schedule based on the collective input. A majority of distributed coordination ap...

This paper provides a characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in settings where agents have one-dimensional or multi-dimensional types, quasi-linear utility functions and interdependent valuations. The characterization is derived in terms of conditions for the underlying allocation function. We do this by making a link to network theory and building complete directed grap...

In mechanism design, for a given type space, there may be incentive compatible mechanisms which are not affine maximizers. We prove that for two-player games on a discrete type space, any given mechanism can be turned into an affine maximizer through a nontrivial perturbation of the type space. Furthermore, our theorem is the strongest possible in this setup. Our proof relies on new results on ...

This paper proposes an ascending-bid auction for efficiently allocating multiple complementary indivisible commodities. The seller has a reserve price for every bundle of goods and determines the quantity for sale based upon bidders’ reported demands. The auctioneer announces a price for every bundle of goods, every bidder subsequently responds with a set of goods demanded at these prices, and ...