We revisit the contract-theoretic literature on privatization initiated by Hart et al. (1997). This has two major shortcomings. First, it is focused ex-ante investment incentives, whereas ex-post inefficiencies which are ubiquitous in real world cannot be explained. Second, ownership does not matter when incentive contracts can written. Both shortcomings due to fact that this studied case of sy...

Incentive mechanism plays a critical role in privacyaware crowdsensing. Most previous studies on co-design of incentive mechanism and privacy preservation assume a trustworthy fusion center (FC). Very recent work has taken steps to relax the assumption on trustworthy FC and allows participatory users (PUs) to add well calibrated noise to their raw sensing data before reporting them, whereas the...

In a property-rights framework, we study how the organizational form and quantity contracts interact in generating investment incentives. Our model nests standard property-rights and hold-up models as special cases. We admit general message-dependent contracts but provide conditions under which non-contingent contracts are optimal. This allows to fully characterize optimal contracts. First, we ...

We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on both the actual and the optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become inferior when some agents value fairness. Conversely, implicit bonus contracts that are doomed to fail among purely selfish actors provide powerful incenti...