One of the main aspects of theory of mind is intentionality which refers to recognizing other people's intentions in their behaviors. The aim of this study was to investigate intentionality in children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Thirty children with ADHD were compared to thirty age- and IQ-matched normal children. All participants were assessed using the moving shapes...

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Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: they are underived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived intentional sta...

A striking feature of the contemporary philosophical scene is the flourishing of a number of research programs aimed in one way or another at making intentional soup out of nonintentional bones—more carefully, specifying in a resolutely nonintentional, nonsemantic vocabulary, sufficient conditions for states of an organism or other system to qualify as contentful representations. This is a move...

If any sense modality represents, vision does, but argument is needed to show that smell does. This paper rebuts two reasons for doubting that smell represents, and offers several arguments that it does. The paper then considers several recent proposals as to exactly what a smell represents, and defends a version of the author's original proposal-that a smell represents a miasma in the air-agai...

Introducing the notion of experience as a primitive construct, we illustrate how the BDI cycle is completed: experiences generate beliefs, which in turn generate desires, which in turn generate intentions, which in turn generate new experiences. Furthermore, the notion of experience is used to ground social BDI agents in the physical world. We do not assume an agent’s BDI model already exists, ...

The mainstream theories and models of the physical sciences, including neuroscience, are all consistent with the principle of causality. Wholly causal explanations make sense of how things go, but are inherently value-neutral, providing no objective basis for true beliefs being better than false beliefs, nor for it being better to intend wisely than foolishly. Dennett (1987) makes a related poi...

Some thoughts are externally singular: there is an object which the thought is about. Some thoughts which are not externally singular are internally singular: although there is no object the thought is about, it recruits resources of a kind appropriate to external singularity. An illustration: Jack wants a sloop (I am using ‘‘thought’’ broadly, so that wanting is a species of thinking). The des...

Enactive approaches in cognitive science propose that perception, and more generally cognitive experience, are strongly mediated by embodied (sensory-motor) processes, and that our primary experience of the world is action-oriented or pragmatic (Noë 2004; Thompson 2007; Varela et al. 1991). Extended mind theorists propose that cognition supervenes on embodied and environmental processes such as...

The paper concerns the role of intentionality in reasoning about wrong doing. Anthropologists have claimed that, in certain non-Western societies, people ignore whether an act of wrong doing is committed intentionally or accidentally. To examine this proposition, we look at the case of Madagascar. We start by analyzing how Malagasy people respond to incest, and we find that in this case they do...