We consider a sequential two-party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. The informed second mover can either accept or reject the offer and payoffs are determined as in the ultimatum game. Otherwise the uninformed second mover states his own demand...

As computer science and complex network theory develop, non-cooperative games and their formation and application on complex networks have been important research topics. In the inter-firm innovation network, it is a typical game behavior for firms to invest in their alliance partners. Accounting for the possibility that firms can be resource constrained, this paper analyzes a coordination game...

A serious difficulty in concurrent programming of a distributed system is how to deal with scheduling and load balancing of such a system which may consist of heterogeneous computers. In this paper, we formulate the static load-balancing problem in single class job distributed systems as a cooperative game among computers. The computers comprising the distributed system are modeled as M/M/1 que...

Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient outcome among the many individually rational possibilities in a strategic game, and (2) establishing a ...

To commit credibly in bargaining is crucial: In the ultimatum game with its one– sided early commitment power the “proposer” gets (nearly) the whole pie while the “responder” is left with (almost) nothing. When both parties commit simultaneously the (a)symmetric Nash(1950)–bargaining solution, however, predicts (more or less) equal shares. Relying on a continuous connection of these two games b...

This paper proposes a hybrid game-based distribution network-multi-virtual power plant cooperative operation strategy for the different decision-making positions of networks and virtual plants. Firstly, system operator (DSO) is introduced as leader, DSO aiming at maximizing its own benefits, formulates dynamic tariff to guide alliance optimize operation; alliance, follower, responds DSO's an au...

This paper studies how the level of the public good and the amounts of taxes are determined in a bargaining model. Using the Nash bargaining solution as the solution concept, the paper shows that the nature of individuals’ preferences over the public good and private good determines the nature of the tax regime. In particular, the paper characterizes conditions on preferences under which the Na...

Consider a two-person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and collect payo¤s while bargaining proceeds. Theory is silent regarding how the surplus is likely to be split, because a folk theorem applies. Perturbing such a game with a rich set of behavioral types for each player yields a speci…c asymptotic prediction for how the surplus will be divided, as the perturba...

Our main objective is to investigate the influence of the bargaining power within a chain on its industry. As a building block, we first discuss the implications of bargaining within a single chain by considering an asymmetric Nash bargaining on the wholesale price (BW). We show that both Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) and VI strategies are special cases of the BW contract. We then develop the N...