A bimatrix game (A, B) is called a game of rank k if the rank of the matrix A + B is at most k. We consider the problem of enumerating the Nash equilibria in (non-degenerate) games of rank 1. In particular, we show that even for games of rank 1 not all equilibria can be reached by a Lemke– Howson path and present a parametric simplex-type algorithm for enumerating all Nash equilibria of a non-d...

The aim of the paper is to propose a game-theoretic description of strategies available to players in dialogues. We show how existing dialogical systems can be formalized as Nash-style games, and how the game-theoretic concept of solutions (dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium) can be used to analyse these systems. Our first study, discussed in this article, describes the game DC introduced by...

Several multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms have been proposed to optimize agents’ decisions. Due to the complexity of the problem, the majority of the previously developed MARL algorithms assumed agents either had some knowledge of the underlying game (such as Nash equilibria) and/or observed other agents actions and the rewards they received. We introduce a new MARL algorithm ...

Among other solution concepts, the notion of the pure Nash equilibrium plays a central role in Game Theory. Pure Nash equilibria in a game characterize situations with non-cooperative deterministic players in which no player has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from the current situation in order to achieve a higher payoff. Unfortunately, it is well known that there are games that do not h...

We focus on the problem of computing an -Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, when is an absolute constant. We present a simple algorithm for computing a 3 4 -Nash equilibrium for any bimatrix game in strongly polynomial time and we next show how to extend this algorithm so as to obtain a (potentially stronger) parameterized approximation. Namely, we present an algorithm that computes a 2+λ 4 -...

Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in classical game theory is a refinement of Nash equilibrium concept. We investigate the consequences when a small group of mutants using quantum strategies try to invade a classical ESS in a population engaged in symmetric bimatrix game of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Secondly we show that in an asymmetric quantum game between two players an ESS pair can be made to ...

in this paper, we present an application of intuitionistic fuzzyprogramming to a two person bi-matrix game (pair of payoffs matrices) for thesolution with mixed strategies using linear membership and non-membershipfunctions. we also introduce the intuitionistic fuzzy(if) goal for a choiceof a strategy in a payoff matrix in order to incorporate ambiguity of humanjudgements; a player wants to max...

Given a bimatrix game, the associated leadership or commitment games are defined as the games at which one player, the leader, commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy and the other player, the follower, chooses his strategy after having observed the irrevocable commitment of the leader. Based on a result by von Stengel and Zamir [2010], the notions of commitment value and commitment optimal stra...

A systematic theory is introduced that describes stochastic effects in game theory. In a biological context, such effects are relevant for the evolution of finite populations with frequency-dependent selection. They are characterized by quantum Nash equilibria, a generalization of the well-known Nash equilibrium points in classical game theory. The implications of this theory for biological sys...

We study continuous time Bertrand oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing similar goods compete with one another by setting prices. We first analyze a static version of this game in order to better understand the strategies played in the dynamic setting. Within the static game, we characterize the Nash equilibrium when there are N players with heterogeneous costs. In the dynamic ...