We present a novel negotiation protocol to facilitate energy exchange between off-grid homes that are equipped with renewable energy generation and electricity storage. Our protocol imposes restrictions over negotiation such that it reduces the complex interdependent multi-issue negotiation to one where agents have a strategy profile in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We show that our protoco...

Note: This is a only a draft version, so there could be flaws. If you find any errors, please do send email to [email protected]. A more thorough version would be available soon in this space. In this chapter, we introduce the all important notion of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We provide several examples to illustrate this notion. We show that pure strategy Nash equilibrium may not ex...

The purpose of this article is to investigate the impact that the introduction of a carbon price signal will have on wholesale electricity prices, carbon-pass-through rates and retail electricity rates in the states making up the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM). In order to assess this, we employ an agent based model of the NEM called the ANEM model which contains many of the salie...

The transformation of the European energy system requires substantial investment in transmission capacity to facilitate cross-border trade and to efficiently integrate renewable energy sources. However, network planning in the EU is still mainly a national prerogative. In contrast to other studies aiming to identify the pan-European (continental) welfare-optimal transmission expansion, we inves...

In this paper we adopt general sum stochas tic games as a framework for multiagent re inforcement learning Our work extends pre vious work by Littman on zero sum stochas tic games to a broader framework We de sign a multiagent Q learning method under this framework and prove that it converges to a Nash equilibrium under speci ed condi tions This algorithm is useful for nding the optimal strateg...

This paper is concerned with a model of a one-sided limit order book, viewed as a noncooperative game for n players. Agents offer various quantities of an asset at different prices, ranging over a finite set Ων = {(i/ν)P ; i = 1, . . . , ν}, competing to fulfill an incoming order, whose size X is not known a priori. Players can have different payoff functions, reflecting different beliefs about...

The robustness of the Bayes–Nash equilibrium prediction for seller revenue in auctions is investigated. In a framework of interdependent valuations generated from independent signals, seller expected revenue may fall well below the equilibrium prediction, even though the individual payoff consequences of suboptimal bidding may be small for each individual bidder. This possibility would be relev...

The multi-leader-follower game can be looked on as a generalization of the Nash equilibrium problem and the Stackelberg game, which contains several leaders and a number of followers. Recently, the multi-leader-follower game has been drawing more and more attention, for example, in electricity power markets. However, when we formulate a general multi-leader-follower game as a single-level game,...