When major investors own shares in multiple firms in the same industry, the cross ownership changes competitive interests and moves the equilibrium closer to the monopoly solution. In the presence of cross ownership, the traditional measure of industry concentration, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, fails to accurately reflect the level of competition in the market. We extend the literature on c...

We study the factors that induce asset managers to hold both equity and bond positions in the same company (“twin ownership”), as well as the corporate finance implications of such a joint ownmership for the firms they hold. We show that twin ownership is determined by a tradeoff between the benefits of information acquisition and greater monitoring/enforcing that an equity stake confers to a b...

In 2003 the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) proposed modest relaxation of its media ownership concentration rules; the proposal aroused heated political opposition and has been partially overturned by Congress and stayed pending appellate review. The purpose of this paper is quite narrow: to explore, from a public policy perspective, measurement issues associated with media ownership con...

Human social life is structured by social norms creating both obligations and entitlements. Recent research has found that young children enforce simple obligations against norm violators by protesting. It is not known, however, whether they understand entitlements in the sense that they will actively object to a second party attempting to interfere in something that a third party is entitled t...

This paper is to explore that if ownership structure exactly affects on earnings management, especially on how to constrain executive compensation motivation to earnings management in the emerging market of China. We use five variables to quantify various corporate governance mechanisms including ownership structure and executive compensation for 1024 listed firms sample within two years. We fi...

We present a model in which wage-setting structures explain cross-country variation in corporate governance. The model predicts a nonmonotonic relationship between the level of centralization in wage-bargaining institutions and the levels of firm ownership concentration and investor protection legislation. Low and high degrees of centralization yield less concentrated ownership and more investo...