In this paper, several seller–buyer supply chain models are proposed which incorporate both cost factors as well as elements of competition and cooperation between seller and buyer. We assume that unit marketing expenditure and unit price charged by the buyer influence the demand of the product being sold. The relationships between seller and buyer will be modeled by non-cooperative and coopera...

We model competition between two firms selling identical goods to customers who arrive in the market stochastically. Shoppers choose where to purchase based upon both price and the time cost associated with waiting for service. One seller provides two separate queues, each with its own server, while the other seller has a single queue and server. We explore the market impact of the multi-server...

According to the development of the Internet, multi-media contents such as music, picture, movie, etc. are treated by digital format on the network. It enables us to purchase digital contents via a net easily. However, it causes several problems such as violation of ownership and illegal distribution of the copy. Digital fingerprinting is used to trace back the illegal users, where unique ID kn...

clarification of the legal and religious status of property ownership rights and paving the way for elimination of defects and completing existing rules and therefore, expanding economic security as well as determining and explaining the limits of expropriation by religious legitimate government and religious statement of permission of such an action from the islamic state and clearing objectiv...

In electronic commerce markets, agents often should acquire multiple resources to fulfil a high-level task. In order to attain such resources they need to compete with each other. In multi-agent environments, in which competition is involved, negotiation would be an interaction between agents in order to reach an agreement on resource allocation and to be coordinated with each other. In recent ...

We study a buyer-seller problem in which the good is information and there are no property rights. The buyer is reluctant to pay for information whose value he does not know, but the seller cannot credibly reveal this value without disclosing the information itself. Information comes as divisible hard evidence. We show how the seller can appropriate a substantial fraction of the value through g...