In a multilateral bargaining problem with one buyer and two heterogeneous sellers owning perfectly complementary units, we find that there exists an equilibrium which leads to inefficient delays when the buyer negotiates with the higher-valuation seller first and where players are extremely impatient. We also find that the buyer prefers to negotiate with the lower-valuation seller first, except...

A two period bargaining model with asymmetric information is considered. An uninformed seller charges a uniform price to two buyers. A risk averse seller offers a larger price cut in period two when one buyer remains in the market than when two buyers remain. The price in period one is sensitive to the number of buyers and the seller’s degree of risk aversion. The initial price charged to a sin...

We study a model in which the seller of an indivisible object faces two potential buyers and makes an offer to either of them in each period. We find that the seller’s ability to extract surplus from them depends crucially on the value of the cost of switching from one buyer to the next. If the seller is pessimistic about the buyers’ valuations and there is a switching cost, however small, then...

We examine the buyer-seller problem under different levels of commitment. The seller is informed of the quality of the good, which affects both his cost and the buyer’s valuation, but the buyer is not. We characterize the allocations that can be achieved through mechanisms in which, unlike with full commitment, the buyer has the option to “walk away” after observing a given offer. We further ch...

in this paper a two-stage supply chain with a buyer and seller have been studied. it is assumed that lead time is probabilistic and demand is fixed. in the decentralized model it can be observed each supply chain member try to make the decision to maximize their profits and it will effect on the other members of supply chain and in the comparison with centralized model with assuming the seller ...

We study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have two potentially different, commonly known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. seller, however, does not benefit from these calculate equilibrium strategies of analyze optimal design seller in this environment terms expected number potential bidders.

The majority of academic papers on the Internet auction design does not distinguish between the auctioneer and the object owner, whereas nowadays leading Internet auction websites operate primarily as mediators that provide the platforms with no physical possessions of the auction objects. The role separation between the auctioneer and the object owner (seller) creates both incentive misalignme...

Consider a seller who faces two customer segments with differing valuations of quality of a durable product. Demand is stationary and knos-n. the technology exists to release two products simultaneously, and the seller car1 commit in advance to subsequent prices and qualities. Should he introduce two differentiated products at once or one at a time? Undcr the simultaneous strategy, the lowcr qu...