We consider a zero-sum stopping game (Dynkin’s game) with a threshold probability criterion in discrete time stochastic processes. We first obtain fundamental characterization of value function of the game and optimal stopping times for both players as the result of the classical Dynkin’s game, but the value function of the game and the optimal stopping time for each player depend upon a thresh...

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>We study a nonzero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic differential game for controlled reflecting diffusion processes in the nonnegative orthant. We treat two cost evaluation criteria, namely, discounted and ergodic cost. Under certain assumptions, we establish existence of Nash equilibria. Also, completely characterize equilibrium criterion space stationary Markov...

A mixed strategy, a strategy of unpredictable actions, is applicable to business, politics, and sports. Playing strategies, however, poses challenge, as the game theory involves calculating probabilities executing random actions. I test i.i.d. hypotheses Nash equilibrium with simplest experiments in which student participants play zero-sum games multiple iterations possibly figure out optimal (...

The business cycle is a frequent topic in economic research; however, the approach based on individual strategies often remains neglected. aspiration of this study to prove that behavior individuals can originate and fuel an cycle. For purpose, we are using algorithm repeated dove–hawk game. results reveal sum output society affected by ratio strategies. Cyclical changes will be translated into...

The Kelly framework is the natural multi-period extension of one-period mean-variance model Markowitz in sense that efficient frontier characterized by trading strategies having maximal instantaneous Sharpe ratio. We show traders naturally trade such a way as to induce an equilibrium for covariance matrix. This equilibrium, arising from alone, has property correlation can be described saddle po...

Kalmar [2, 1928-9] proved that Chess is strictly determined. Von Neumann-Morgenstern [5, 1944] proved the same for any finite two-person zero-sum perfect-information (PI) game. The latter result yields a minimax theorem for (finite) non-zero-sum PI games. Fix a PI, and a player, Ann. Convert this game to a two-person zero-sum game between Ann and the other players (considered as one player), in...