We investigate the effects of bid improvement rules and bidder value asymmetry on bidder collusion in experimental ascending price auctions without communication. We find that the strict bid improvement rule and private values are not always sufficient to break collusion among well-motivated bidders. Collusion still occurs as long as bidder gains from collusion are high. JEL classification code...

Our study concerns tacit knowledge that has been one of the most discussed concepts in the field of contemporary knowledge management. We are particularly interested in the issues concerning 1) the nature of tacit knowledge, and 2) the idea of explication of tacit knowledge. We approach these questions from the perspective of cognitive science. Tacit knowledge is deeply related to conceptual mo...

this study aims to explore the relationship between entrepreneurial behavior and tacit knowledge sharing through 314 questionnaires provided by university incubators. for data analysis, pearson correlation is used. the study has found that there are meaningful relationships between entrepreneurial behavior and tacit knowledge sharing in university incubators. existing research has concentrated ...

0

Collusion is the practice of two or more parties deliberately cooperating to the detriment of others. While such behavior may be desirable in certain circumstances, in many it is considered dishonest and unfair. If agents otherwise hold strictly to the established rules, though, collusion can be challenging to police. In this paper, we introduce an automatic method for collusion detection in se...

On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion * by Jo Seldeslachts, Tomaso Duso and Enrico Pennings Though there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint venture (RJV) participation facilitating collusion, empirical tests are rare. Even more so, there are few empirical tests on the general theme of collusion. This note tries to fill this gap by assuming a ...

We investigate bidder collusion in one-sided ascending price auctions without communication. If bidding rules in an English-type auction allow bidders to match each others' bids, collusion can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of a one-shot auction game. Our earlier experiments show that in common value auctions with complete information, collusion does occur and is sustainable even when bidde...

RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES Theory suggests that tacit clues inform clinical judgements, but the prevalence and role of tacit clues during clinical interactions is unknown. This study explored whether doctors and patients identify information likely to be tacit clues or judgements based on tacit clues during health maintenance examinations. METHODS Qualitative analysis of video elicitation inter...

Collusion is covert co-operation between participants of a game. It poses serious technical, game design, and communal problems to multiplayer games that do not allow the players to share knowledge or resources with other players. In this paper, we review different types of collusion and introduce two measures for collusion detection. We also propose a model and a simple game, implemented in a ...

Collusion is covert co-operation between participants of a game. It poses a serious problem to multiplayer games that do not allow the players to share knowledge or resources with other players. Fair play requires that players act independently to gain best possible individual result and are also able to analyse the action-reaction loop of the other players. In this paper, we discern two basic ...