6.6). In [3, 31, 321 Wu, McCoy, Tracy, and Barouch (WMTB) discovered that the scaled two point functions for the two-dimensional Ising model are expressible in terms of a Painled function of the third kind. This discovery was made by using results from the thesis of Myers [21] (which was in part based upon earlier work by Latta [16]) who established a connection between a linear integral equati...

The often-told tale of Zulu King Shaka and his diviners may tell us more about colonial religion and politics in the nineteenth century than it does about Zulu religion and politics. The tale unfolds in various nineteenth-century books, popular and contemporary histories, and in oral traditions. Writers have frequently portrayed it as a key point in King Shaka’s leadership, most especially E A ...

Recently, Baxter and King (1995) developed a bandpass lter which overcomes to some extent the well known drawbacks of the Hodrick-Prescott lter. In this paper, the circumstances under which the Baxter-King lter is preferable are identi ed, and a modi cation is presented which takes into account spurious side lobes generated by this method. I am indebted to Brian A'Hearn, Markus Heintel, Jim Mal...

For many classification problems, genetic algorithms prove to be effective without extensive domain engineering. However, the chess King-Rook-King endgame problem appears to be an exception. We explore whether modifications to a baseline parallel genetic algorithm can improve the accuracy on this particular problem. After describing the problem domain and our implementation of a parallel geneti...

G ary King, a professor of social science at Harvard University and a member of the National Academy of Sciences, fashions tools that harness the power of statistics, machine learning, and informatics to make sense of the numbers that matter to society. From evaluating the efficacy of a Mexican health policy reform to predicting the fate of the US Social Security trust fund, King’s sophisticate...

Mutualisms generate surpluses. Although much of the theoretical literature to date has focused on mechanisms by which cooperation is stabilized so that these surpluses can continue to be produced and enjoyed, we address a second question: how will these surpluses be distributed among the participants? We approach this question from an evolutionary game theory perspective, exploring how the coev...