Cryptography is an important tool in the design and implementation of electronic voting schemes for it provides the property of verifiability, which is not provided in the traditional voting. But in the real life, neither can most voters understand the profound theory of cryptographic e-voting nor can they perform the complicated cryptographic computation. An e-voting system is presented in thi...

For several years, T-Systems Enterprise Services GmbH has been researching the creation of a highly secure voting system that meets the latest cryptological standards. With exclusive responsibility for the W.I.E.N (Wählen in elektronischen Netzwerken, Voting in electronic networks) research project supported by the government since 2005, T-Systems are studying the implementation of online votin...

We investigate the voting rules in the Council of the European Union. It is known that the current system, according to the Treaty of Nice, and the voting system proposed in the Lisbon treaty both strongly deviate from the square root law by Penrose. This is known to be the ideal voting rule under certain assumptions. In 2004 SS lomczynski and ˙ Zyczkowski designed a voting system, now known as...

We present Selections, a new cryptographic voting protocol that is end-to-end verifiable and suitable for Internet voting. After a one-time in-person registration, voters can cast ballots in an arbitrary number of elections. We say a system provides over-the-shoulder coercionresistance if a voter can undetectably avoid complying with an adversary that is present during the vote casting process....

In this paper, we study the strategy-proofness properties of the randomized Condorcet voting system (RCVS). Discovered at several occasions independently, the RCVS is arguably the natural extension of the Condorcet method to cases where a deterministic Condorcet winner does not exists. Indeed, it selects the always-existing and essentially unique Condorcet winner of lotteries over alternatives....

Cryptographic voting protocols offer the promise of verifiable voting without needing to trust the integrity of any software in the system. However, these cryptographic protocols are only one part of a larger system composed of voting machines, software implementations, and election procedures, and we must analyze their security by considering the system in its entirety. In this paper, we analy...

I EEE is actively involved in creating standards for voting systems and related applications via the IEEE Voting System Standards Committee (VSSC/1622). An upcoming VSSC/1622.2 standard on election results reporting lets election officials organize election results and report them to the media. Another goal of VSSC/1622 is to improve US voting processes by creating a common data format (CDF) fo...

The I-Voting system designed and implemented in Estonia is one of the first nationwide Internet voting systems. Since its creation, it has been met with praise but also with close scrutiny. Concerns regarding security breaches have focused on in-person election observations, code reviews and adversarial testing on system components. These concerns have led many to conclude that there are variou...

About …fty years ago, Efron noted some counterintuitive properties of the long-term behavior of contests involving dice. For instance, consider the 6-sided dice whose sides are labeled (4,4,4,4,0,0), (3,3,3,3,3,3), (6,6,2,2,2,2), and (5,5,5,1,1,1). Each die has a 2/3 probability of rolling a higher number than the next one in the list, and the last has the same 2/3 probability of rolling a high...

This report presents certain integrity vulnerabilities in the Diebold AV-TSx Voting Terminal1. We present two attacks based on these vulnerabilities: one attack swaps the votes of two candidates and another erases the name of one candidate from the slate. These attacks do not require the modification of the operating system of the voting terminal (as it was the case in a number of previous atta...