In games with strategic substitutes (GSS), convergence of the best response dynamic starting from the inf (or sup) of the strategy space is equivalent to global stability (convergence of every adaptive dynamic to the same pure strategy Nash equilibrium). Consequently, in GSS, global stability can be analyzed using a single best response dynamic. Moreover, in GSS, global stability is equivalent ...

This paper concludes the study of transition paths in the continuous-time recombinant endogenous growth model by providing numerical methods to estimate the threshold initial value of capital (a Skiba-type point) above which the economy takes off toward sustained growth in the long run, while it is doomed to stagnation otherwise. The model is based on the setting first introduced by Tsur and Ze...

Compendious and thorough solutions to the existence of a linear price equilibrium problem, the secondwelfare theorem, and the limit theoremon the core are provided for exchange economieswhose consumption sets are the positive cone of arbitrary ordered Fréchet spaces—dispensing entirely with the assumption that the vector ordering of the commodity space is a lattice. The motivation comes from ec...

We consider an agent-based model of financial markets with asynchronous order arrival in continuous time. Buying and seeling orders arrive in accordance with a Poisson dynamics where the order rates depend both on past prices and the mood of the market. The agents form their demand for an asset on the basis of their forecasts of future prices and where their forecasting rules may change over ti...

We present a model of the behavior of an industry in perfect competition. A new feature in the modeling is the consumers’ role in the evolution of the industry. We show a link in between market behavior and economic growth at industry level. Growth may occur due to increases in technology or consumers’ wealth, due to a positive change in consumers’ preferences concerning this good or increasing...

In two-sided matching markets with contracts, the existence of stable outcomes can be guaranteed only under certain restrictions on preferences; the typical restriction is that all agents’ preferences are substitutable. We show that, in markets with a continuum of each type of agent, it is only necessary that agents on one side of the market have substitutable preferences to guarantee the exist...

This paper studies the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for nonatomic games where players take actions in an infinite-dimensional Banach space. For any infinitedimensional Banach space, we construct a nonatomic game with actions in this space which has no pure-strategy Nash equilibria, provided that the player space is modeled by the usual Lebesgue unit interval. We also show that if ...

We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. We introduce a so-called bi-choice graph for each pair of stable matchings and characterize its structure. Exploiting this structure we obtain as a corollary the “lone wolf” theorem and a decomposability result. The latter result together with transitivity of blocking ...