Profit rate stickiness means the asymmetric behavior of banking profit rate with respect to positive and negative shocks. Scrutinizing this behavior would suggest a new perspective on policy tools and banking supervision. In this regard, this paper applies hidden panel cointegration, proposed by Hatemi-J (2018), to study profit rate and bank specific characteristics nexus for all banks listed o...

The failure or success of the banking industry depends largely on the industry’s ability to properly evaluate credit risk. In the consumer-lending context, the bank’s goal is to maximize income by issuing as many good loans to consumers as possible while avoiding losses associated with bad loans. Mistakes could severely affect profits because the losses associated with one bad loan may undermin...

We provide new evidence on the effectiveness of microfinance intervention for poverty alleviation. We apply the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method to data collected in a recent randomized control trial (RCT) in India by Banerjee et al. (2014). The PSM method allows us to answer an additional set of questions not answered by the original study. First, we explore the characteristics of MFI bo...

How do the smallest firms in Mexico finance their operations? We examine this question using data from surveys of microenterprises undertaken in 1994 and 1998. The survey identifies sources of startup capital, and also provides information on current bank loans and access to trade credit from suppliers. There is evidence that the credit crunch experienced by Mexico in the second half of the 199...

This paper investigates macroeconomic effects of bank regulation in a continuoustime macro-finance framework with both bond-financing and bank-financing. Risky firms appreciate bank credit because banks are efficient at liquidating assets for troubled firms. However, risky firms must pay the risk premium for banks’ exposure to aggregate risks. Our framework captures the feature that the cost of...

It is well known that conflicts of interests between borrowers and creditors can raise the cost of external financing. In this paper we provide new evidence that borrower-creditor conflicts of interests also affect the sensitivity of debt financing to aggregate business conditions. In the presence of incomplete contracts, creditors cannot fully observe or verify diversion of free cash flow by b...