the present study is based on the assumption that the more the women enjoy the cultural capital, the higher their position in the power structure of the family and the more their bargaining power. for evaluating the aforementioned theory, the required data were attained through survey methodology and questionnaire tool and by selecting a sample of 385 married women resided in shiraz. the sampli...

We examine the implications, for social choice, of individuals having an intrinsic sense of fairness. Taking the viewpoint that social justice reflects the moral attitudes of the constituent members, we analyze the effect of the intensity of the individual sense of fairness on the solution of Nash bargaining over random allocation procedures. We use a stylized model of university admission poli...

In a credit market with enforcement constraints, we study the effects of a change in the outside options of a potential defaulter on the terms of the credit contract, as well as on borrower payoffs. The results crucially depend on the allocation of “bargaining power” between the borrower and the lender. We prove that there is a crucial threshold of relative weights such that if the borrower has...

We consider a model of decentralized bargaining among three parties. Parties meet one-on-one after being randomly matched, and can sell or buy votes to one another. The party with a majority of the votes can decide to implement its preferred policy or extend negotiations to capture additional rents. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in which a pa...

game theoretic models in political science frequently suggest that the outcomes of bargaining processes in democratic systems should be significantly influenced by the precise character of proposal and veto opportunities, on the one hand, and by informational asymmetries that exist among participants, on the other. In parliamentary systems, although the cabinet is widely recognized as the centr...

Abstract: Although military cooperation among rebel groups in multi-party civil wars could help rebels defeat or extract concessions from an incumbent government, violent conflict among rebel groups is empirically prevalent. Why do rebel groups in multi-actor civil wars choose to fight one another? This paper models the strategic dilemma facing rebel groups in multi-party civil wars as an alter...

OBJECTIVE To examine the effect of changes in parent-child coresidence on caregiving decisions of non-resident siblings over a 5-year period while controlling for characteristics of the elderly parent and adult children in the family network. METHOD We use difference-in-difference models applied to Health and Retirement Study-Assets and Health Dynamics of the Elderly data to test the hypothes...

This paper studies legislative negotiations between two parties whose political power changes over time. The model has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which becomes very tractable when parties can make offers frequently. This tractability facilitates studying how changes in political power affect implemented policies. An extension of the baseline model analyses how elections influence leg...

We develop a model of repeated multilateral bargaining that links cycles via the identity of the agenda setter. In sharp contrast to the standard history-independent equilibrium predictions, in an experiment, we observe stable and persistent coalitions in terms of member identity, allocations to coalition partners, and agenda-setter identity. Our results call into question the validity of restr...

Often a bargainer can use some form of power—legal, military, or political—to impose a settlement. How does the “outside” option of being able to impose a settlement, albeit at some cost, affect the bargaining? And, how does the probability that the bargaining will break down vary with the distribution of power between the bargainers? These questions are examined by adding the option of imposin...