Abstract In an influential recent paper, Hawthorne, Rothschild, and Spectre (“HRS”) argue that belief is weak. More precisely: they the referent of believe in ordinary language much weaker than epistemologists usually suppose; one needs very little evidence to be entitled a proposition this sense; just concept belief. I here contrary. HRS identify two alleged tests weakness – neg-raising weak u...

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The explainability of robotic systems depends on people’s ability to reliably attribute perceptual beliefs robots, i.e., what robots know (or believe) about objects and events in the world based their perception. However, are not necessarily well understood by majority people interacting with them. In this article, we explain why is a significant, difficult, unique problem social robotics. inab...

Abstract The degrees of belief rational agents should be guided by the evidence available to them. This paper takes as a starting point view—argued elsewhere—that formal model best able capture this idea is one that represents using Dempster–Shafer functions. However, not only respect evidence; they also guide decision and action. Whatever we adopt, need theory works with it: input so represent...

anonymous referee for the Journal of Philosophical Logic for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I also thank Prasanta Bandy-opadhyay, Jim Cain, Francis Jeery Pelletier and Ted Sider for their sugges tions and encouragement, and acknowledge the help of my friend Ramkrish-nan Nambimadom in the construction of a crucial proof. Abstract: This paper is concerned with the co...

This note is a very short presentation of the transferable belief model (TBM), a model for the representation of quantified beliefs based on belief functions. Details must be found in the recent literature. The TBM covers the same domain as the subjective probabilities except probability functions are replaced by belief functions which are much more general. The model is much more flexible than...

Belief functions have been proposed for modeling someone’s degrees of belief. They provide alternatives to the models based on probability functions or on possibility functions. There are several interpretations of belief functions: the lower probabilities model, Dempster’s model, the hint model, the probability of modal propositions model, the transferable belief model. All these models are un...

A simple model of rational belief holds that: (i) an instantaneous snapshot of an ideally rational belief system corresponds to a probability distribution; and (ii) rational belief change occurs by Bayesian conditionalization. But a priori probability distributions of the Kolmogorov sort cannot distinguish between propositions that are simply true from propositions that are necessarily true. Fu...