A learning process is belief affirming if the difference between a player's expected payoff in the next period, and the average of his or her past payoffs converges to zero. We show that every smooth discrete fictitious play and every continuous fictitious play is belief affirming. We also provide conditions under which general averaging processes are belief affirming. Journal of Economic Liter...

In a partially-specified correlated equilibrium (PSCE ) the players are partially informed of the conditional strategies of the other players, and they best respond to the worst-case possible strategy. We construct a decentralized procedure that converges to PSCE when the monitoring is imperfect. This procedure is based on minimizing conditional regret when players obtain noisy signals that dep...

We prove existence of mixed strategy equilibria for a class of discontinuous two-player games with non-compact strategy sets. As a corollary of our main results, we obtain a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria for the firstand second-price two-bidder auctions with toeholds. We also find Klemperer’s (2000) result about the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in the classical Bertrand duopo...

A simple example shows that equilibria can fail to exist in second price (Vickrey) and English auctions when there are both common and private components to bidders' valuations and private information is held on both dimensions. The example shows that equilibrium only exists in the extremes of pure private and pure common values, and that existence in standard models is not robust to a slight p...

We provide a new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution, using fictitious play. Based on the finding that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property and that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game (In, 2014), we present two initial demand games which exactly and approximately imp...

Computation of exact equilibrium values for n-player divide-the-dollar legislative bargaining games as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) with general quota voting rules, recognition probabilities, and discount factors, can be achieved by solving at most n bivariate square linear systems of equations. The approach recovers Eraslan’s (2002) uniqueness result and relies on a characterization of equilib...

This paper is a survey of experimental evidence on behavior in games with communication, focusing on environments where ``talk is cheap'' in the sense that players' messages have no direct payoff implications. Also considered are some environments in which communication was permitted throughout the game, in addition to those environments in which only preplay communication was allowed. Journal ...

Sequential equilibrium and quasi-perfect equilibrium are not invariant under isomorphism of the standard form. We introduce two relaxations of super weak isomorphism which reflect those features of extensive games which determine sequential equilibrium or quasiperfect equilibrium, respectively. Though these concepts rely on details of the extensive form, they are essentially weaker than other s...

This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with convex decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on a set of networks which are unambiguous in terms of centrality. We first characterize both dominant and dominated equilibria. Second, we examine the issue of social coordination ...

We compare two contest. Decentralized in which there are several independent contests with non overlapping contestants and Centralized in which all contestants …ght for a unique prize which is the sum of all prizes in the small contests. We study the relationship between payo¤s and e¤orts between these two contests. Keywords: Centralization, Decentralization, Contests JEL classi…cation: C72; D7...