In this paper, we present a set of allocation algorithms for a dynamic, negotiation-based coalition formation model. The model is for a cooperative multiagent system in which each agent has incomplete information about its dynamic and uncertain world and must respond to sensed events within time constraints. With incomplete information and uncertain world parameters while lacking time, an agent...

Community coalitions are a recognized strategy for addressing pressing public health problems. Despite the promise of coalitions as an effective prevention strategy, results linking coalition efforts to positive community outcomes are mixed. To date, research has primarily focused on determining organizational attributes related to successful internal coalition functioning. The authors' researc...

Proposition 1: As I argued in the paper, there is no equilibrium in which the dictator uses a pure strategy and the ruling coalition conditions its decision to stage a coup on the observed signal. In any equilibrium in mixed strategies, (i) the ruling coalition stages a coup with probability βθ such that, given the correlation between his actions and the signal θ, the dictator is indifferent be...

The coalition formation is an important aspect of multi-agent negotiation and cooperation. Based on the Bilateral Shapley-Value, a multi-sided eigenvalue is presented by using the reference of n-person stochastic cooperative game. It is obvious when multisided eigenvalue have superadditivity, rational agents will combine to one coalition. A dynamic coalition formation algorithm is constructed b...

1Multidisciplinary Oncology Centre (CePO), Lausanne, Switzerland 2Ludwig Institute for Cancer Research (LICR), Lausanne Branch, Lausanne, Switzerland 3Department of Visceral Surgery, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois (CHUV), Lausanne, Switzerland 4National Centre for Competence in Research (NCCR) Molecular Oncology, Swiss Institute for Experimental Cancer Research (ISREC), Epalinges, Swi...

This paper studies coalition formation and payoff division in apex games under the following assumptions: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). In contrast with the results of other two-stage models, all minima...

In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the e¢ cient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coaliti...

We introduce and study higher-order coalition logic, a multi modal monadic second-order logic with operators [{x}ψ]φ expressing that the coalition of all agents satisfying ψ(x) can achieve a state in which φ holds. We use neighborhood semantics to model extensive games of perfect information with simultaneous actions and we provide a framework reasoning about agents in the same way as it is rea...

Congenital coalition of pisiform and hamate is rare and had been considered asymptomatic in the first reports. The authors report a case of bilateral pisiform-hamate coalition in a young patient, causing symptoms of median nerve compression in the carpal tunnel and attritional changes on digital flexor tendons. This type of coalition had not previously been related to such symptoms. Additionall...

Abstract The Cold War and the growth of welfare state constitute two major frameworks for understanding politics society in post-war Western Europe. This chapter discusses how shaped development states selected European countries first decades after 1945. It is argued that mechanisms were important. First, social policies used securing mass loyalty as an anti-communist strategy Second, strongly...